BANCROFT    LIBRARY 


BATTLE 


OF 


BUENA    VISTA 


FROM  THE  "SOUTHERN  QUARTERLY  REVIEW,"  FOR  JANUARY,  1851. 


CHARLESTON,  S.  C. : 

STEAM     POWER -PRESS    OF    WALKER    <fc    JAMES,     NO.    101    EAST -BAY. 

1851. 


BATTLE  OF  BUENA  VISTA. 

1.  The  Battle  of  Buena  Vista,  with  the  Operations  of  the 
Army  of  Occupation,  for  one  month.     By  JAMES  HENRY 
CARLETON,  Capt.  First  Regiment  of  Dragoons.     New- 
York:  Harper  &  Brothers.     1848. 

2.  The  War  with  Mexico  ;  by  R.  S.  RIPLEY,  Brevet  Ma 
jor  in  the  United  States  Army,  First  Lieutenant  of  the 
Second  Regiment  of  Artillery,  etc.     In  2  vols.     New- 
York:  Harper  &  Brothers,  publishers.     1849. 

3.  Campaign  Sketches  of  the   War  with  Mexico ;    by 
Capt.  W.  S.  HENRY,  U.  S.  Army.     With  engravings. 
New- York:  Harper  &  Brothers.     1847. 

4.  The  Mexican  War ;  a  history  of  its  origin,  and  a 
detailed  account  of  the  victories,  which  terminated 
in  the  surrender  of  the  capital,  etc.;  to  which  is  added 
the  treaty  of  peace,  and  valuable  tables,  etc.     By 
EDWARD  D.  MANSFIELD,  Graduate  of  the  United  States 
Military  Academy.     New- York :  Published  by  A.  S. 
Barnes  &  Co.     1850. 

5.  Congressional  Documents,  1848—9. 

IN  a  preceding  number,  the  campaign  of  Gen.  Taylor 
has  been  traced  to  the  capitulation  of  Monterey.  The 
limited  space  allowed  us  prevented  the  full  discussion  of 
our  subject  in  a  single  paper,  and  excluded  many  minor 
views  and  illustrations,  relating  to  the  operations  and 
battles  that  were  criticised.  Compelled  to  divide  the 
Mexican  career  of  Taylor  into  two  periods,  which,  for 
symmetry  and  force,  should  have  been  included  in  a  sin 
gle  representation,  \ve  sought  the  most  natural  point  of 
separation,  and  drew  our  first  conclusion,  at  the  temporary 
suspension  of  arms,  after  the  conquest  of  Monterey.  Other 
reasons  conduced  to  this  selection.  To  that  time,  Taylor 
had  been  our  sole  commander  in  Mexico — he  had  battled 
entirely,  or  in  a  large  proportion,  with  regulars — he  had' 
enjoyed  the  implicit  confidence  of  his  government,  and 
had  regulated  his  movements  according  to  his  own  judg 
ment,  and  on  his  own  responsibility,  with  little,  if  any 
interference,  on  the  part  of  his  superiors  in  authority  ;  and, 
as  we  have  seen,  his  success  was  complete,  under  innu 
merable  adverse  circumstances.  Subsequently,  however, 
there  was  a  change  in  all  these  particulars,  except  the 
last.  The  reliance  of  his  government  was  somewhat 


4  9 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  3 

weakened  by  the  armistice  at  Monterey — by  differing 
with  him  on  the  policy  of  establishing  a  defensive  line, 
as  urged  by  Taylor,  and  advocated  by  Mr.  Calhoun  and 
others — and  perhaps,  also,  by  political  considerations,  since 
it  was  then  first  intimated  that  Taylor  might  become  a 
successful  candidate  for  the  presidency.  Another  chief, 
and  of  higher  rank,  was  ordered  into  the  field,  and,  al 
though  operating  on  a  different  line,  (not  so  directed  defi 
nitely,*  however,)  Taylor  was  thus  subjected  to  a  double 
supervision,  which  was,  to  a  degree,  exercised ;  and  nearly 
all  his  veteran  troops  were  taken  from  him — those  whom 
he  had  taught  to  conquer,  against  every  odds,  and  between 
whom  and  their  leader  existed  that  ardent  attachment 
which  bound  the  tenth  legion  to  Caesar.  Yet  his  advice, 
here,  was  partially  adopted.  On  the  15th  of  October, 
1846,  he  recommended,  for  a  decisive  blow  on  Mexico, 
through  Vera  Cruz,  25,000  men,f  of  which  10,000  should 
be  regulars,  when,  at  that  time,  he  had  but  3,000  regulars 
with  his  army  ;  and,  on  the  12th  of  November,  for  the 
reduction  of  Vera  Cruz  and  the  Castle  only,  he  advised 
10,000  men,!  of  which  4,000  should  be  regulars,  and  pro 
mised  to  hold  3,000  regulars  in  readiness,  to  meet  the  re 
mainder  from  the  States.  In  thus  volunteering  to  deprive 
himself  of  the  sure  means  of  victory,  and  to  incur  the  ex 
posure  to  disaster  and  defeat,  with  inexperienced  soldiers, 
or  compelling  himself  to  inactivity  and  a  defensive  attitude, 
he  made  an  offering  to  patriotism,  without  a  parallel  in 
military  history  ;  but  it  beautifully  illustrates  the  maxim, 
that  "he  never  errs  who  sacrifices  self,"  by  placing  to  his 
military  career  the  crown  of  imperishable  glory.  The 
after  achievement  was  more  important,  and  certainly 
more  brilliant,  than  any  that  preceded  it ;  which  may  be 
ascribed  to  the  vaster  crisis  of  his  position,  and  to  the 
higher  energy,  the  superior  courage,  and  the  more  deter 
mined  will,  that  it  awakened  and  developed. 

Our  topic,  therefore,  will  commence  with  the  resumption 
of  hostilities,  in  Nov.,  1846  ;  and  Gen.  Taylor's  progress 
will  be  briefly  presented,  to  the  consummation  of  his  splen 
did  victory  of  Buena  Vista.  But,  before  proceeding  to 
its  consideration,  it  is  proper  that  we  should  allude,  how- 

*  Letter  of  Secretary  Marcy  to  General  Scott,  Nov.  23d,  188«.  Ex.  Doc. 
number  60,  p.  836. 

f  Letter  General  Taylor,  Ex.  Doc.  number  60,  p.  361. 
|  Ibid,  p.  374. 


4  Battle  of  Buena  Vista. 

ever  briefly,  to  some  of  our  authorities.  It  was  designed 
to  do  this,  before  the  completion  of  our  original  plan ;  but 
this  completion  may  be  long  postponed,  possibly  never 
executed,  and,  as  it  neither  accords  with  our  inclination, 
nor  with  our  regard  for  the  truth  and  impartiality  of  his 
tory,  to  omit  all  notice  of  the  writers  on  the  war,  we  will 
delay  it  no  longer.  Of  the  many  who  have  contributed 
letters  touching  the  events,  or  sketches  of  battles,  or  cam 
paigns,  or  full  military  and  political  histories  of  the  times, 
and  bearing  on  our  subject,  we  will,  on  this  occasion, 
name  only  four.  It  has  been  remarked  that,  in  reading  a 
historical  work,  it  is  a  desideratum  to  know  the  character 
of  the  author,  his  situation  in  society,  his  political  and 
domestic  relations,  and  the  important  circumstances  ol 
his  life,  as  capable  of  furnishing  a  key  to  his  writings,  or 
a  ground  of  confidence  in  his  statements.  We  are  fortu 
nate  in  possessing  this  knowledge  of  three  of  our  authors — 
these  are  all  officers  of  the  army,  distinguished  for  merit, 
as  their  brevets  indicate,  and,  as  they  have  demonstrated, 
each  competent  to  give  an  accurate  and  perspicuouus 
account  of  both  the  campaigns  in  Mexico.  We  will 
take  them  up  in  the  order  of  rank. 

Captain  (now  Brevet  Major)  Henry,  in  his  "  Campaign 
Sketches,"  has  given  a  narrative  of  the  operations  of 
Taylor's  army,  to  which  he  was  attached,  from  the  land 
ing  at  Corpus  Christi  to  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista.  He 
is  not  comprehensive  in  details,  nor  does  he  aim  at  com 
pleteness.  He  omits  the  discussion  of  the  plans  of  cam 
paign,  and  makes  little  if  any  scientific  criticism,  either 
on  plans  or  battles.  His  descriptions  of  the  last  are  clear 
and  correct,  and  all  his  facts  are  reliable.  But  the  espe 
cial  interest  of  his  volumes  consists  in  presenting,  in  easy 
and  flowing  language,  in  a  diary  form,  graphic  delinea 
tions  of  the  country  traversed — incidents  of  the  various 
marches — anecdotes  and  chit-chat  of  camp — the  manner  of 
death,  in  battle,  of  many  officers — becoming  notices  of  the 
author's  comrades,  and  touching  eulogiums  on  his  friends, 
who  were  slain.  Devoid  of  pretension  and  malice,  and  exhi 
biting  often  his  own  lively  and  joyous  disposition,  spirited, 
humorous,  pathetic,  as  the  scene  required,  the  work  affords 
very  pleasant  reading,  and  is  highly  creditable  to  its  wri 
ter. 

Captain  (now  Brevet  Major)  Carleton  wrote  an  account 
of  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista,  including  the  operations  of 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  5 

the  "  army  of  occupation  "  for  one  month.  We  esteem 
this  quite  a  brilliant  performance.  It  contains  some  errors 
and  omissions,  demanding  revision  and  correction,  and  a 
few  redundancies,  to  which  the  pruning  knife  could  be 
judiciously  applied.  Thus  perfected,  it  would  present  the 
most  full,  forcible  and  finished  description  of  this  great 
battle,  and  would  survive  all  the  partial  and  more  ephe 
meral — indeed,  all  the  sketches — yet  written.  The  impor 
tant  events  are  prominently  exhibited,  in  the  gorgeous 
style  of  a  rich  imagination,  yet  generally  with  correct 
taste.  He  participated  in  the  scenes  he  describes — an 
important  advantage  over  others — he  witnessed  what  he 
depicts,  with  some  of  the  colouring,  but  more  than  the 
truth  of  poetry,  and,  impressed  with  the  grandeur  of  the 
achievement,  he  often  rises  into  eloquence.  The  book  is 
a  monument  to  his  ability,  beyond  any  of  his  deeds  in 
arms — will  live  when  they  shall  be  forgotten,  whatever 
they  may  be — and  is  worthy  of  permanent  place  in  the 
American  library. 

Lieutenant  (and  Brevet  Major,  also,)  Ripley  has  offered 
the  only  complete  history  yet  written  of  the  entire  war. 
He  is  a  younger  man,  a  younger  officer,  and  less  familiar 
with  the  pen,  than  the  others.  The  task  he  assumed  was 
a  bold  and  ambitious  one ;  but  indefatigable  energy,  a 
characteristic  of  the  man,  has  accomplished  it.  We  are 
surprised  that  he  should  have  entered  so  fully  into  the 
political  discussions  of  the  day.  But  it  is  more  to  be 
wondered  at,  that  he  should  have  adopted  with  enthusiasm 
his  political  creed — right,  as  we  are  constrained  to  say  it 
is, — and  have  permitted  it  to  bias  his  judgment  upon  mili 
tary  operations,  and  military  achievements,  when  accom 
plished  by  leaders  professing  an  antagonist  political 
faith.  This  is  certainly  an  error  on  the  part  of  a  soldier. 
Like  other  citizens,  he  is  entitled  to  his  opinions ;  and 
when  the  State  law,  wherever  his  station  may  be,  autho 
rizes,  he  may  vote  accordingly.  And,  on  all  suitable  oc 
casions,  he  is  at  liberty,  temperately  and  judiciously,  to 
express  his  convictions.  But  it  is  not  his  province  to  be 
an  active  partisan,  nor  is  it  consistent  with  his  position. 
He  is  commissioned  for  life,  and  owes  subordination  to 
existing  power.  His  superiors  in  the  government  are 
liable  to  change  ;  not  so  with  himself.  The  exponents  of 
his  principles  may  continue  at  the  head  of  affairs  but  for 
a  brief  period  ;  the  opponents  may  attain  the  ascendancy, 
and,  with  too  much  political  ardour,  carried  away  by 


6  Battle  of  Bucna  Vista. 

strong  adherence  to  the  one,  and  bitter  dislike  of  the  other, 
he  may  reluctantly  and  negligently  perform  what  the  last 
might  require  of  him.  In  a  General,  it  might,  in  war.  lead 
to  disaster  and  national  disgrace  ;  in  peace,  to  endless 
orders  and  evasions,  and  consequent  detriment  to  the  pub 
lic  interest.  In  a  junior  officer,  the  proclivity  would  exist, 
yet  the  evil  not  occur,  only  through  failure  of  the  power 
and  the  opportunity.  A  military  writer  of  a  military  his 
tory — and  Napier,  whom  our  author  admires,  is  an  excellent 
example — should  deal  with  politics  in  general,  rather  than 
in  detail ;  without  ever  descending  into  minute  analyses  of 
political  questions,  or  denunciations  of  political  parties, 
or  sarcasms  on  political  leaders.  He  should  present  a 
clear,  accurate  atid  comprehensive  narrative  of  military 
events,  with  lucid  and  applicable  professional  criticism, 
and  with  allusions  to  State  affairs,  and  such  only,  as  may 
be  essential  to  a  proper  understanding  of  the  military 
operations.  But,  a  military  work,  vindicating  one  set  of 
political  principles,  and  one  political  sect,  with  ex  parte 
earnestness,  and  correspondingly  depreciating  their  oppo- 
sites,  whatever  may  be  its  pretensions,  cannot  be  received 
as  impartial  history,  and,  whatever  its  literary  merit,  is 
not  becoming  to  the  dignity  of  a  gallant  soldier. 

It  has  been  said  that  Major  Ripley  did  not  write  the 
book  that  bears  his  name.  The  army,  generally,  enter 
tain  this  opinion,  and  some  have  even  asserted  that  he 
never  saw  it  until  published  !  A  member  of  the  military 
family  of  a  certair  distinguished  general  in  the  war,  it 
has  been  said  that  the  chief  dictated  and  arranged,  and 
the  subordinate  (aide)  adopted  and  fathered  the  history. 
It  is  affirmed  that  the  last  possessed  neither  the  political 
experience  and  knowledge,  nor  the  partisan  rancour,  exhi 
bited  in  its  pages;  nor  could  he  have  wielded  the  contro 
versial  pen  which  defends  the  administration  and  depre 
ciates  the  (supposed)  opposition  generals.  Suspicion  has 
even  gone  so  far  as  to  intimate  that  two  political  writers 
are  implicated  in  its  production — one  having  been  a  con 
spicuous  member  of  Mr.  Folk's  cabinet.  From  our  peru 
sal,  we  did  not  derive  these  impressions,  and  we  regard 
the  criticism  as  unduly  harsh.  That  the  military  portion 
of  the  book  may  be  mainly  attributed  to  Ripley  we  have 
no  doubt.  The  military  terms,  the  tactical  phraseology, 
the  quotations  from  Napier,  interspersed  through  the  de 
scriptions  of  the  combats,  and  elsewhere,  and  the  air  01 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  7 

assumed  authority,  in  giving  utterance  to  oracular  military 
dicta,  are  certainty  Ripley's.  A  difference,  perhaps,  in 
style — more  terse,  more  pointed,  and  barbed  with  personal 
venom,  of  wider  grasp,  and  more  equally  sustained — may 
indicate  the  work  of  an  older  and  more  interested  head, 
in  some,  if  not  all,  of  the  controversial  chapters.  And,  in 
corroboration,  without  quoting  many  pages  equally  con 
vincing,  we  refer  to  the  second  volume,  pp.  222,  363  and 
629,  in  which  the  writer  speaks  like  one  in  power,  and 
almost  assumes  the  first  person.  But,  without  distinguish 
ing  the  authors,  and  their  several  parts,  we  will  regard 
the  book^^as  a  whole,  and  remark  upon  it  as  a  truthful 
and  "  impartial "  history,  as  professed  to  be  in  its  preface. 
The  work  is  quite  well  written,  and  is  printed  and  pub 
lished  in  the  usually  good  style  of  the  Harpers.  In  dic 
tion,  it  is,  in  places,  diffusive  and  somewhat  heavy,  and 
new  expressions,  such  as  "adulous,"  vol.  i.,  p.  62,  are 
occasionally  coined.  Here  and  there,  are  manifested 
more  of  the  smartness  of  special  pleading,  than  of  the 
grave  analysis  and  deliberate  judgment  of  historical  wri 
ting.  Yet  there  is  much  vivid  and  forcible  narrative — 
the  combats  are  depicted  with  warmth  and  correctness, 
and  the  manner,  in  general,  is  direct  and  perspicuous. 
The  sources  of  information  have  been  thoroughly  ran 
sacked — much  industry  of  research,  and  much  labour  of 
investigation,  and  an  able  sifting  of  documents,  are  ob 
vious.  The  Mexican  authorities  were  also  attentively 
examined — their  State  matters  well  discussed — their  civil 
and  military  dissensions,  the  purposes  and  policy  of  their 
leaders  and  parties  ;  and  the  influences  exerted  on  all,  by 
the  progress  of  the  war,  are  strongly  presented.  And  in 
this  respect  the  book  will  be  highly  valuable  for  future 
reference,  since  it  is  very  doubtful  if  the  same  data  can 
be  again  collected.  It  was  scarcely  necessary,  however, 
to  give  the  Mexican  statements  prominence  over  our 
own,  and  least  of  all  was  it  proper  to  base  upon  them 
censures  of  our  generals,  as  in  vol.  i.,  p.  441,  in  which 
blame  is  cast  on  Taylor  for  not  acting  at  Buena  Vista  as 
a  Mexican  officer  subsequently  said  that  he  might  have 
done  with  success  !  The  introductory  history  of  Mexico 
is  summary  and  satisfactory.  The  account  of  Kearney's 
march  to  Santa  Fe — of  the  conquest  of  New  Mexico — of 
the  civil  government  erected,  with  its  defence,  is  well 
written;  temperate,  truthful  and  sufficiently  copious.  No 
prejudice  is  betrayed  here ;  ample  justice  is  done  to  all 


8  Battle  of  Buena  Vista. 

concerned,  and  the  narrative  is  without  redundancies. 
Were  the  entire  history  penned  in  the  same  spirit  of  can 
dour  with  this  chapter,  it  would  be  a  valuable  record  of 
our  achievements — a  standard  authority — and  worthy  a 
permanent  place  in  every  library.  Wool's  expedition, 
destined  for  Chihuahua,  is  similarly  handled,  and  merits 
similar  praise.  And  we  will  include,  likewise,  the  sketch 
es  of  naval  operations.  The  recital  of  events  in  Califor 
nia  is  made  with  great  minuteness,  and  the  comments 
on  the  difficulties  that  arose  among  the  American  lead 
ers*  are  liberal,  and,  we  think,  just. 

*  Several  errors  are  committed,  for  one  of  which  Ripley  is  not  blameable, 
since  he  adopted  the  official  report  of  Com.  Sloat ;  but  two  of  them  demand 
of  us  some  notice.  A  pretty  thorough  account  of  this  conquest  may  be  found 
in  the  Review,  of  July,  1849,  and,  to  fortify  asseverations  there,  we  are  con 
strained  to  take  issue  with  Ripley  and  his  authorities.  He  says  that  Com. 
Sloat  received  information  at  Mazatlan,  on  7th  June,  1846,  that  induced  him 
to  make  a  descent  on  California,  and  Sloat's  letter,  of  31st  July,  1846,  justifies 
him.  To  the  assertion,  we  offer  the  following,  in  contradiction.  On  the  31st 
of  May,  the  Commodore  wrote,  that  he  had  "received  such  intelligence  as 
would  justify  his  acting."  On  th  6th  of  June,  (Cong.  Doc.,  1st  session  30th 
Cong.  Report  Senate  Com.,  number  75,)  he  said  that,  on  reflection,  he  could 
not  act.  and  that  it  was  humiliating,  etc.,  because  to  all  the  world  it  appeared 
"  that  we  were  actually  at  war  on  the  other  (Gulf )  coast."  For  this  timidity 
he  was  afterwards  rebuked  by  Secretary  Bancroft.  Now,  we  ask  what  more 
could  he  have  learned  next  day,  (the  7th  June,)  to  determine  him,  than  that 
hostilities  existed  between  the  two  countries  ?  As  stated  on  the  6th,  he  was, 
at  all  events,  going  to  California.  He  arrived  on  the  2d  July,  and,  hearing  of 
Fremont's  movements,  who  had  revolutionized  the  province,  presumed  they 
•were  authorized,  and  on  the  7th  he  took  the  town  of  Monterey.  On  6th  July 
he  had  written  to  Capt.  Montgomery,  at  San  Francisco,  that  he  "  preferred 
being  sacrificed  for  doing  too  much,  rather  than  too  little."  (same  Document,) 
Why  sacrificed  at  all,  if  he  received  news  on  7th  June,  to  justify  him,  under 
bis  orders  of  24th  of  June,  1845  ?  But  Fremont  clinches  the  matter,  when  he 
deposes  thus  before  the  above  named  committee  :  "  He  (Sloat,  at  Monterey, 
on  Fremont's  arrival  there,  19th  July,)  then  inquired  to  know  under  what 
instructions  I  had  acted,  in  taking  up  arms  under  the  Mexican  authorities.  I 
informed  him  that  I  had  acted  on  my  own  responsibility,  and  without  any 
authority  from  the  government,  to  justify  hostilities.  Commodore  Sloat  ap 
peared  greatly  disturbed  with  this  information,  and  gave  me  distinctly  to  un 
derstand,  that,  in  raising  the  flag  at  Monterey,  he  had  acted  upon  the  faith  of 
our  operations  in  the  North" 

Ripley  says,  again,  that  Fre'mont  «•  reported  to  Gen.  Kearney,  as  command 
ing  the  ft-rces,"  at  Los  Angelos,  and  intimates,  on  this  account,  more  severe 
censure  for  his  subsequent  disobedience.  Now,  Fre'mont  did  not  report  to 
Kearney  at  all.  He  wrote  a  private  letter,  in  reply  to  several  notes  of  the 
same  character.  When  the  convention  of  Cowenga  was  sent  to  Angelos,  the 
bearer,  Col.  Russell,  was  directed  tc  ascertain  who  was  in  command,  and  to 
deliver  it  accordingly.  (Testimony  of  Col.  Russell,  Fremont's  Court  Martial, 
p.  321.)  By  the  testimony  of  both  Russell  and  Kearney,  pp.  321,  324,  the 
last  acknowledged  Stockton  to  be  supreme,  advised  the  delivery  of  the  paper 
to  him,  and  it  was  done.  It  was  never  offered  to  Kearney.  These  items  are 
of  no  great  importance,  but  we  cite  and  refute  them  to  establish  truth,  and  to 
prove  what  we  had  previously  writtea 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  9 

Little  more  may  be  said  in  praise  of  the  work.  The 
remainder  is  composed  in  a  reprehensible  spirit  of  parti- 
zanship.  The  views  it  offers  are  altogether  one-sided  ; 
the  arguments  in  support  are  too  shallow,  to  impose 
either  on  the  student  of  history  or  on  those  who  are  fami 
liar  with  the  matters  in  dispute.  The  ordinary  reader, 
however,  of  which  class  the  masses  consist,  is  liable  to  be 
warped  into  prejudice,  and  induced  to  look  with  cold  ad 
miration  on  the  glorious  deeds  of  some  of  the  greatest 
soldiers  in  our  annals,  and  to  learn,  in  the  end,  to  regard 
those  deeds  as  due,  not  in  any  degree,  to  the  high  qualities 
of  these  chiefs,  but  to  the  mere  chances  of  fortune.  To 
aid  in  dispelling  such  delusions,  and  in  averting  somewhat 
the  ill  consequences  of  such  impressions,  we  will  briefly 
dissect  a  portion  of  the  book — not  to  make  an  exposure 
of  even  a  large  part  of  its  unfair  reasoning  and  false 
conclusions,  but  sufficiently  so  to  disclose  the  animus  of 
the  author. 

An  elaborate  vindication  of  the  administration  is  at 
tempted,  upon  every  point  that  has  been  brought  into  con 
troversy.  Discredit  or  error  is  not  allowed,  in  any  in 
stance.  The  country  had  pronounced  judgment,  and  Mr. 
Polk  and  his  minister  received  liberal  commendation,  for 
the  generally  able  discharge  of  their  duties.  The  conduct 
of  the  war  was  in  striking  contrast  with  that  of  1812,  and 
the  credit  was  awarded  where  it  was  merited.  But  these 
officers  possessed  neither  omniscience  nor  ubiquity ;  their 
judgments  were  human,  and  therefore  fallible,  and,  in  the 
management  of  a  foreign  war,  waged  1500  to  2000  miles 
from  the  seat  of  government,  it  was  not  only  natural,  but 
inevitable,  that  blunders  should  be  sometimes  committed 
That  there  were  such,  every  candid  mind,  however  in 
clined  to  the  existing  authorities,  must  acknowledge.  Foi 
some,  there  are  valid  excuses  ;  for  others,  depending  upon 
political  party  aims,  rather  than  purely  patriotic  impulses 
and  objects,  there  can  be  none — and  the  discriminating 
writer,  honestly  endeavouring  to  establish  truth,  must 
censure  or  condemn,  as  the  case  requires. 

At  p.  250-1,  vol.  i.,  Ripley  makes  a  warm  defence  of 
the  authorities  at  Washington.  At  355,  he  vindicates  the 
Secretary  for  issuing  an  order  directly  to  Gen.  Patterson, 
instead  of  transmitting  it  through  Taylor,  to  prepare  for 
an  attack  on  Tampico.  He  says,  the  violation  of  this 
great  principle,  can  ordinarily  "  lead  to  nothing  but  evil,'* 


10  Battle  of  Buena  Vista. 

and,  in  the  next  breath,  remarks,  that  it  was  not  "  very 
flagrant"  in  this  case.  If  the  military  principle  is  of 
the  prominence  he  gives  it,  and  we  fully  concur,  any  vio 
lation,  under  any  circumstances,  must  inevitably  terminate 
in  immediate  or  remote  evil.  It  strikes  at  the  very  root 
of  subordination,  and  a  single  exercise  of  such  power,  by 
an  authority  like  the  head,  of  the  war  department,  would 
be  a  precedent  and  a  sanction  for  its  exercise  through  all 
the  grades  of  service,  tending  to  subvert  all  order  and 
discipline.  There  is  no  military  rule,  perhaps,  of  greater 
force,  than  to  preserve  "  the  chain  of  communication  (of 
orders)  which  binds  the  military  compact,"*  and  it  is  for 
tunate  that  occasions  arise  at  intervals  for  its  practical 
assertion  and  general  recognition.  Gen.  Jackson  was 
similarly  interfered  with,  in  1817,  (see  letter,  Nashville, 
Tenn.,  April  22d,  1817,)  and  did  not  hesitate  to  resent 
it  in  the  strongest  terms,  although  at  a  period  of  profound 
peace,  when  little  of  the  detriment  might  have  accrued 
which  was  calculated  to  affect  Taylor,  engaged  in  a  for 
eign  war.  The  principle,  however,  existed  at  all  times, 
and  its  assertion  was  equally  necessary,  in  peace  and  war. 
Taylor  protested,  in  a  manly  letter,  and  the  Secretary 
returned  some  sort  of  an  apology.  Yet  Ripley  justifies 
it,  on  grounds  quite  flimsy  to  military  men,  and  declares 
the  departure  from  a  fundamental  maxim  not  "  very  fla 
grant."  But,  a  soldier  himself,  we  do  not  regard  this  as 
his  opinion,  and  we  offer  it  as  one  proof  of  his  strong 
political  bias.  At  p.  503,  vol.  i.,  the  President  is  sustained 
in  the  most  wanton  and  indefensible  of  all  his  acts — the 
recommendation  to  create  the  office  of  Lieutenant  Gene 
ral,  with  the  intimation  that  Benton  was  to  fill  it.  The 
friends  of  Mr.  Polk  regarded  the  measure  as  ill  advised, 
since  a  majority  of  them,  we  believe,  united  in  rejecting 
the  bill  to  authorize  it.  And  the  good  faith  of  Mr.  Polk, 
as  an  officer  and  a  man,  is  seriously  implicated.  The 
President  and  Scott  became  reconciled  in  Nov.,  1846. 
They  had  "many  long  personal  interviews"! — the  pro 
gress  of  the  war,  the  plans  for  its  prosecution,  including 
the  Vera  Cruz  expedition,  were  discussed — mutual  confi 
dence  appeared  to  be  restored — Scott  was  unrcservedly 
entrusted  with  the  command  in  Mexico,  and  left  for  the 

*  Gen.  Jackson's  letter,  22d  April,  1817- 
f  Scott's  letter,  24th  Feb.,  1848. 


(h 

Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  1 1 

seat  of  war,  with  expressions  of  "  fervent  gratitude"  for  the 
"  confidence  and  kindness  "  of  the  President.  Yet,  Ripley 
-isays,  Mansfield  &teg  and  Benton  stated  it  publicly,  that  this 
same  President,  eVen  then,  had  resolved  to  supersede  Scott 
in  command  of  the  army  in  the  field  !  The  Secretary 
wrote  to  Scott,  23d  Nov.,  1846,  "It  is  not  proposed  to  con 
trol  your  operations  by  definite  and  positive  instructions. 
*  #  *  rpjjg  WOrk  is  before  you,  and  the  means  provided 
are  committed  to  you,  in  the  full  confidence  that  you  will 
use  them  to  the  best  advantage."  This  looks  very  much 
like  yielding  entire  control  to  Scott,  and  must  have  in 
spired  him  with  the  belief,  that  he  was  to  command  the 
army  to  the  conquest  of  peace.  And  we  know  that  such 
was  his  opinion,  for,  when  informed  that  a  Lieutenant 
General  was  to  be  created,  (he  then  at  the  Brazos,)  so 
impressed  was  he  with  the  confidence  of  the  President, 
that  he  said,  "  Mr.  Polk  must  appoint  me."  Yet,  Ripley 
says,  there  is  not  a  trace  of  the  pen  to  show  that  the  Pre 
sident  ever  designed  that  Gen.  Scott  should  do  more  than 
capture  Vera  Cruz  and  the  Castle  !  And  we  are  com 
pelled  by  this,  and  the  statements  of  others,  to  believe  it. 
Thus  Scott  was  to  incur  the  labour  of  organizing  an 
army — the  hazard  of  landing  on  the  coast  of  Mexico,  op 
posite  the  highway  to  the  capital — endure  the  drudgery 
of  bombarding,  and  occupying  works  incapable  of  a  pro 
longed  resistance,  attended  with  fatigue  and  comparatively 
little  glory — and,  when  the  vista  of  true  military  renown 
was  opened  before  him,  and  all  his  toils  were  to  be  amply 
rewarded,  at  this  moment  he  was  to  be  superseded  and  de 
graded  !  The  General-in-chief  of  the  United  States  Ar 
my — of  high  military  reputation,  and  of  unsurpassed 
military  attainments — to  be  over-rode  by  a  civilian — a 
man  not  "  baptized  in  fire,"  and  eminent  only  as  a  politi 
cian  !  This  is  one  of  the  strongest  instances  of  the  predo 
minance  of  party  feeling  and  party  designs,  over  both 
justice  and  patriotism,  in  the  President ;  and  as  Ripley,  an 
educated  officer,  defends  the  measure,  we  cannot  offer  a 
more  forcible  example  of  his  own  party  feeling  against 
Scott,  nor  of  his  political  bias. 

We  are  of  those  who  firmly  believe — and  all  history 
bears  us  out — that  mere  theoretical  military  knowledge 
does  not  constitute,  and  cannot  create,  the  great  com 
mander.  The  high  traits  essential  to  success — to  unvaried 
success,  under  all  circumstances — may  be  educated  and 


12  Battle  of  Buena  Vista. 

perfected  ;  but  they  are  born  with  the  man,  and  are  de 
veloped  by  events.  Hannibal  had  no  experience  of  war, 
when  associated  in  the  chief  command  in  Spain,  and  had 
acquired  but  little  when  elevated  to  the  supreme  control  % 
and  his  hatred  of  Rome  induced  an  evasion  or  disruption 
of  all  treaty  stipulations  ;  yet,  for  sixteen  years,  his  career 
was  a  series  of  splendid  triumphs.  Caesar  made  his  first 
campaign  at  41  years  of  age,  and,  from  the  outset,  he  was 
General-in-chief — his  first  advent  into  Spain  being  civil, 
rather  than  military,  and  for  the  purpose  of  filling  his 
coffers,  rather  than  extending  his  military  reputation;  and 
his  early  affair  with  the  pirates  only  a  daring  and  chival 
rous  adventure  of — at  the  moment  in  exile — a  reckless 
youth.  Hampden  and  Cromwell  were  great  leaders, 
without  theoretic  information.  Lord  Clive  and  Jackson 
were  extraordinary  soldiers,  without  any  military  attain 
ment.  And  Prince  Eugene  said,  "  The  greatest  generals 
have  commonly  been  those  who  have  been  at  once  raised 
to  command,  and  introduced  to  the  great  operations  of 
war,  without  being  occupied  in  the  petty  calculations  and 
manoeuvres  which  employ  the  time  of  inferior  officers." 
We  will  not  say  that  Col.  Benton  might  not  have 
risen  at  once  to  the  summit  of  military  renown,  by  the 
force  of  exalted  genius  ;  and,  with  such  belief,  necessity 
would  have  justified  the  President  in  giving  him  supreme 
command  in  the  war.  But  while  Scott  lived,  and  aspired 
to  new  laurels  in  his  profession,  we  maintain  that  this 
necessity  did  not  exist.  Scott  was  no  unfledged  and  un 
tried  soldier.  His  past  career  guaranteed  the  accomplish 
ment  of  brilliant  operations.  The  war  of  1812  proved 
his  abilities,  and  his  reputation  for  courage  and  skill  was 
at  least  co-extensive  with  the  country.  Not  a  slur  had 
ever  been  cast  upon  his  untarnished  escutcheon  as  a  great 
captain. 

Ripley  exhibits  some  very  decided  military  prejudices. 
The  tone  of  his  book  is  adverse  to  both  our  generals — 
Scott  and  Taylor.  Few  things  achieved  by  them  are 
heartily  approved — indeed,  none,  we  believe,  without  some 
grain  of  qualification.  Neither  in  the  operations  nor  in 
the  combats,  has  full  justice  been  awarded.  These  are 
narrated  with  general  accuracy,  and  described  with  full 
ness  and  much  force.  But,  in  his  "  observations  "  and 
running  commentaries,  with  some  judicious  remarks, 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  13 

there  is  a  great  deal  of  depreciating  criticism,  some  sar 
casm,  and  many  sneers. 

His  maxims  are  carelessly  scanned,  or,  for  effect ;  parts 
are  quoted  to  sustain  the  author's  views ;  while  the  whole 
would,  in  some  instances,  have  contradicted  him,  or  have 
modified  his  conclusions.  At  p.  95,  vol.  1,  is  a  fling  at  all 
the  generals  of  the  army,  for  their  imbecility,  with  "hardly 
an  exception."  At  p.  160  is  an  illiberal  allusion  to  Gen. 
Taylor,  who,  it  appears,  in  his  dispatch  of  1st  Aug.,  1846, 
presented,  as  a  consideration,  in  his  march  to  Monterey, 
the  question  of  subsistence,  and  said,  in  this  respect,  it 
would  be  somewhat  of  an  "  experiment,"  since  he  could 
acquire  from  the  Mexicans  themselves  no  definite  infor 
mation  on  the  subject,  and  it  was  utterly  impracticable, 
with  his  limited  means  of  transportation,  to  carry  supplies 
in  a  rapid  movement  on  Saltillo.  Ripley  designates  it  as 
an  "  experimental  expedition,"  and  positively  asserts  that 
Taylor  urged  no  other  reason  for  his  advance,  than  to 
ascertain  the  subsistence  resources  of  that  region.  Yet, 
in  a  previous  letter,  (July  2d,  1846,)  Taylor  speaks  of  an 
ulterior  object,  of  no  less  importance  than  cutting  off  the 
northern  provinces  of  Mexico  ;  and,  some  time  after,  in  a 
letter  to  Wool,  he  remarked  that  he  expected  to  be  at 
Saltillo  on  the  1st  of  October.  Unjust  and  uncalled  for 
originally,  what  will  be  thought  of  the  repetition  of  the 
charge — always  with  a  sneer — at  least  seven  times  in  the 
same  volume,  and  when,  in  p.  161,  he  actually  quotes  the 
passage  containing  Taylor's  ulterior  views.  At  p.  J69, 
he  says,  "  without  any  definite  object,  other  than  to  ascer 
tain  the  capacity  of  a  certain  region,  in  subsistence,"  etc. 
At  p.  248,  "  the  expedition  was  treated  of  as  one  of  expe 
riment  upon  the  agricultural  capacity  of  the  valley  of  the 
San  Juan,"  etc.  At  p.  252,  "  as  the  whole  expedition  had 
been  experimental,"  etc.  At  p.  315,  "had  enjoyed  two 
weeks  observation  upon  the  agricultural  capacity  of  the 
country."  At  p.  355,  "  information  respecting  the  capacity 
of  the  country  to  support  6000  men,  or  more,  had  been 
the  avowed  object  in  marching  upon  that  town."  (Monte 
rey.)  At  p.  503,  "  Gen.  Taylor's  plan,  which,  after  his 
experiment  at  Monterey."  And  at  p.  313,  "  and  as  the 
General  had  been  unable  to  extend  his  views  beyond  the 
experimental  march  to  Monterey,"  etc.  Here  the  word 
unable  betrays  conclusively  the  tincture  of  bitterness 


14  Battle  of  Buena  Vista. 

which  prompted  all  the  allusions.  At  p.  355,  he  is  cap 
tious  with  Taylor  on  other  grounds.  Again,  at  p.  304,  in 
regard  to  his  orders  to  Wool.  At  p.  257,  harsh  concerning 
the  battle  of  Monterey.  At  434,  severe  on  Taylor,  and 
ardent  in  defence  of  the  administration.  He  is  also  unjust 
respecting  Buena  Vista,  and  the  preliminary  operations, 
and  particularly  so  in  alluding  to  the  withdrawal  of  troops 
from  Taylor,  by  Scott. 

At  p.  155,  vol.  1,  is  a  sarcasm  on  Scott,  for  his  letter  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  in  which  he  speaks  of  conquering 
a  peace,  by  "regular,  incessant,  and  forward  movements" 
against  the  enemy,  and  these  words  are  quoted,  TrSN^emg 
riorcuieu&^  We  wonder  how  else  Major  Ripley  would 
have  subdued  Mexico,  and,  as  a  consequence,  have  "con 
quered  peace  ?"  How  else  was  it  accomplished  at  last  T* 
Two  pages  previously  are  slighting  remarks.  At  pp.  11, 
12,  vol.  2,  the  same.  At  p.  82,  vol.  2,  he  blames  Scott  for 
the  attack  and  failure  of  Pillow  at  Cerro  Gordo,  end  did 
not  see  '*  the  necessity  of  attacking  them  (the  lines)  se 
riously,  in  front."  Yet  the  ground  had  been  reconnoitered 
by  Pillow  himself.  Scott  relied  upon  his  knowledge,  and, 
at  his  own  desire,  we  believe,  ordered  him  to  the  post. 
The  works  proved  stronger  than  either  general  had  sup 
posed,  although  battery  no.  1, — which  was  assailed — or, 
more  properly,  the  angle  between  nos.  1  and  2 — had  been 
seen  in  reverse  from  the  opposite  side  of  Plan  del  Rio, 
(p.  31,  vol.  2.)  In  the  same  page,  and  previously,  are 
strictures  on  Scott's  report,  that  his  order  for  the  battle 
had  been  "  executed,"  and  some  deviations  are  given. 
Why  not  publish  the  "  order,"  and  permit  the  public  judg 
ment  on  its  execution  ?  We  regard  it  as  a  masterly  pro 
gramme  !  No  other  battle  had  so  detailed  a  sketch  in 
advance,  and  few,  in  history,  were  so  exactly  executed, 
according  to  the  design.  At  p.  87,  vol.  2,  he  censures 
Scott,  in  a  "however,"  for  taking  Quitman  along  with 
the  army,  instead  of  Pillow,  when  both  were  made  Major 
Generals,  and  there  were  not,  indeed,  troops  enough  for 
the  command  of  one,  the  Georgia  and  other  regiments 
having  been  sent  home.  This  course,  on  the  part  of 
Scott,  was  within  his  discretion,  and  his  motives  are  his 
own.  The  service  suffered  no  injury  by  the  decision. 
Pillow  returned  in  season  for  the  operations  in  the  valley, 
and,  while  absent,  had  the  opportunity,  at  New-Orleans, 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  15 

of  vindicating  himself  from  the  charges  of  Col.  Haskell. 
At  p.  96,  the  government*  would  not  intrust  Scott  with 
the  power  to  negotiate,  because  it  was  "  aware  of  his  cha 
racter  and  feelings."  This  is  a  very  grave  insinuation. 
Was  Scott  partial  to  the  Mexicans  ?  Were  his  political 
feelings  bitter  against  the  administration  ?  Did  he  carry 
party  schemes  to  the  head  of  an  invading  army  ?  Would 
he  have  destroyed  his  reputation,  and  -have  sacrificed  his 
patriotism,  by  assenting  to  a  treaty  that,  though  momen 
tarily  elevating  his  party,  would  injure  permanently  the 
interest  of  his  country  and  impair  its  honour  ?  All  this, 
if  anything,  may  be  legitimately  inferred,  and  the  hero  of 
Niagara  was  as  far  removed  from  such  a  "  character," 
and  such  "  feelings,"  as  light  is  from  darkness.  The  two 
powers,  of  war  and  diplomacy,  have  often  been  united. 
Napoleon,  in  Italy,  is  a  famous  example.  The  great  sol 
dier  necessarily  possesses  many  of  the  high  qualities  of 
the  statesman.  Were  this  the  occasion,  and  space  per 
mitted,  the  propriety  of  uniting  the  powers  could  be 
demonstrated.  Scott  had  already  acted  successfully  in 
both  capacities  ;  and,  withholding  the  one,  and  conferring 
it  upon  Chief  Clerk  Trist,  betrayed  a  design  to  injure 
Scott,  or  a  want  of  confidence  in  his  integrity  or  ability, 
deeply  wounding  to  his  sensibility  as  a  man,  to  his  pride 
as  a  soldier  in  chief  command,  and  was  well  calculated 
to  sour  him  against  the  existing  authority  at  Washington. 
At  p.  150,  Scott's  motives — none  tjie^best — are  divined,  for 
the  reconciliation  with  Trist.  Ana!  finally,  at  p.  432,  Rip- 
ley  exults  that  Scott's  name  had  been  dropped,  as  a  can 
didate  for  the  presidency,  in  consequence  of  the  proceed 
ings  of  the  celebrated  Court  of  Inquiry  !  We  cannot  now 
discuss  this  matter,  nor  can  we  afford  room  for  other  cita 
tions  of  Ripley's  prejudices.  The  2d  volume  is  replete 
with  disparagement  of  Scott — all  that  he  did,  when  present, 
was  suggested  to  him  ;  all  that  was  done,  when  he  was 
not  on  the  ground,  was  the  sole  work  of  others !  We 
have,  however,  exposed  enough,  we  trust,  to  illustrate  the 
controlling  sentiment  of  the  book,  and  will  improve,  if 
need  be,  other  occasions  to  discuss  our  differences  with 
the  author  on  other  points.  In  the  mean  time,  we  sin- 

*  The  President  and  his  cabinet  are  not  the  government ;  but  the  term,  -with 
that  meaning,  has  crept  into  all  the  official  correspondence,  and  we  continue  it 
for  brevity,  as  well  as  for  euphony. 


16  Battle  of  Buena  Vista. 

cerely  recommend  to  him  a  critical  revision  of  his  work, 
the  suppression  of  many  illiberal  passages,  the  assumption 
of  a  more  elevated  and  impartial  tone,  and  an  appendix, 
containing  the  official  papers  relating  to  controverted 
points.  This  accomplished,  it  will  do  him  great  credit — 
it  will  afford  interesting  and  instructive  reading,  and  be 
come  a  standard  authority  in  our  collections.  Did  it  not 
possess  some  decided  features  of  merit,  we  assure  him, 
even  this  much  time  would  not  have  been  spared  to  the 
consideration  of  its  errors. 

The  volume  of  E.  D.  Mansfield,  "  a  graduate  of  the 
United  States  Military  Academy,"  and  the  last  we  propose 
to  notice,  purports  to  be  a  history  of  the  war,  but  we 
regard  it  rather  as  a  general  review  of  the  war.  It  gives 
the  principal  events,  in  order,  but  enters  into  no  discus 
sions  of  moment — avoids  all  details  of  description,  and 
all  analyses  of  political  or  military  action,  and  is  not  very 
particular  about  dates.  It  aims  to  be  just,  as  far  as  it 
goes,  and  we  do  not  think  it  unduly  partial.  The  vindi 
cation  of  Gen.  Scott,  throughout,  indicates  an  ardent 
friendship  or  admiration  for  that  officer ;  yet  he  is  not 
lauded  extravagantly  nor  improperly,  at  the  expense  of 
others.  It  is  well  enough  written,  without  any  special 
claim  to  commendation,  for  style  or  arrangement.  The 
high  praise  awarded  to  West  Point  graduates,  both  here 
and  in  Ripley's  book,  does  not  emanate  with  grace  or 
delicacy  from  eleves  of  that  institution.*  The  services  of 
those  gentlemen  were  too  conspicuous  to  be  overlooked 
by  the  country — they  constituted  a  majority  of  the  regular 
officers,  and  were  freely  distributed  among  the  volunteer 
troops — and  other  writers  could  have  displayed  their  me 
rits,  and  the  high  character  and  eminent  value  of  that 
academy,  without  any  sacrifice  of  modesty  or  good  taste. 
We  are  sure  that  so  high  a  mark  could  never  be  omitted 
or  disregarded  in  any  comppehensive  and  fair  representa 
tion  of  our  Mexican  operations — and  none  other  will  be 

*  A  writer  of  South-Carolina,  signing  "  Marlborough,"  to  a  series  of  highly 
interesting  and  valuable  sketches  of  the  battles  and  manoeuvres  in  which  the 
Palmetto  Regiment  was  engaged,  remarks  :  "  Let  others  gainsay,  but  it  is  our 
opinion,  that  the  scenes  of  glory  and  success,  which  have  so  constantly  attended 
our  arms  in  Mexico,  are  attributable  to  the  admirable  stamina  to  be  found 
among  the  officers  of  the  regular  army.  They  are,  in  the  main,  the  effects  of 
West  Point  intelligence  and  West  Point  discipline  !"  Such  compliments  are 
appreciated,  and  they  have  an  influence. 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  17 


generally  received  f<Tr-pe*^maaejatly-f)¥^se*¥€d.  Claiming 
the  same  alma  mater,  we  feel  justified  in  making  these 
remarks,  which  another,  through  fear  of  the  charge  of 
invidiousness,  however  appropriate  they  may  be,  would 
hesitate  to  offer.  The  book  of  Mansfield,  as  a  general 
guide,  giving  a  succinct  account  of  the  operations  of  the 
war,  is  very  useful,  and  the  original  tables,  in  the  appen 
dix,  are  highly  interesting  and  valuable. 

After  this,  in  a  measure,  digression,  much  longer  than 
was  anticipated,  we  turn  to  the  main  subject  of  this  pa 
per  —  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista,  with  a  summary  notice 
of  the  preliminary  operations. 

The  armistice  at  Monterey  was  disapproved  by  the 
President,  and,  according  to  its  terms,  he  sent  instructions 
to  Taylor,  on  the  13th  October,  that  it  should  cease  at 
xonce.  On  the  6th  of  November,  Taylor  dispatched  an 
officer,  to  communicate  to  Santa  Anna  the  decision  of  our 
government.  On  the  1  3th  of  the  same  month,  Worth  was 
directed  to  occupy  Saltillo  —  Taylor  accompanying  the 
column,  and  it  was  effected,  without  resistance,  tin  the 
16th.  Wool  had  reached  Monclova  on  the  &9th  of  Octo 
ber,  en  route  for  Chihuahua,  and,  in  a  letter  to  Taylor, 
pertinently  inquired  what  was  to  be  gained  by  the  move 
ment  on  that  place.  In  reply,  he  was  instructed  to  aban 
don  the  original  enterprize,  and  march  his  forces  to  Par- 
ras,  70  miles  south-west  of  Saltillo.  The  expedition  was 
a  misdirected  one,  and  proved  a  failure.  Had  it  been 
accomplished,  the  result  would  not  have  been  at  all  com 
mensurate  with  the  labour  employed,  and  the  suffering 
and  expense  incurred,  in  organizing  an  army  in  the  inte 
rior  of  Western  Texas,  and  transporting  its  supplies,  and 
moving  the  troops,  through  a  desert  prairie,  on  this  side 
the  Rio  Grande,  and  a  comparatively  barren  and  difficult 
country  beyond.  Victoria  was  taken  by  our  troops,  under 
Quitman,  on  the  29th  of  December,  and  Tampico  having 
been  seized  by  the  navy,  011  the  14th  of  November,  the 
country,  from  the  Rio  Grande  and  the  coast,  down  to 
Tampico,  westward  to  the  Sierra  Madre,  was  in  our  pos 
session.  And,  as  Kearney  had  subdued  New  Mexico,  and 
Stockton  and  Fremont  had  subjugated  California,  the 
scheme,  as  far  as  contemplated  and  desirable,  of  severing 
from  Mexico  her  northern  provinces,  was  executed.  The 
position  of  the  army,  however,  is  regarded  by  Ripley  and 
others  as  having  been  vicious,  and,  in  a  militEiry  point  of 
2 


18  Battle  of  Buena  Vista. 

view,  untenable.  Under  some  circumstances,  we  might 
concur  in  the  opinion  ;  but,  considering  those  that  actually 
existed,  we  cannot  hesitate  to  approve  the  proceedings  of 
Taylor,  and  we  think  substantial  reasons  may  be  offered 
in  vindication.  Taylor's  letter,  of  the  8th  of  December, 
1846,  explains  fully  his  objects,  and  establishes  conclu 
sively  the  justness  of  his  measures.  If  it  were  intended 
to  occupy  and  maintain  a  defensive  line,  it  would  run 
from  Parras  to  Tampico.  Victoria  and  Saltillo  would  be 
intermediate  points,  and  the  latter  of  greater  importance 
than  any,  since  it  covers  the  only  accessible  route  for 
artillery,  from  San  Louis  through  the  pass  of  La  Angos 
tura.  With  a  strong  garrison,  and  fortified  by  works 
here,  the  plan  would  be  consummated.  As  Taylor  es 
teemed  the  Mexicans  not  at  all  formidable,  and  having 
little  confidence  in  themselves,  without  artillery,  the  other 
points  could  be  readily  held,  with  moderate  forces,  sup 
plied  with  that  arm.  The  Tula  passes  debouched  no 
great  way  from  Victoria.  They  were  practicable  for 
cavalry  and  infantry  ;  but,  as  Ripley  suspects,*  if  for  ar 
tillery  also,  to  secure  the  line,  it  would  only  have  been 
necessary  to  render  this  place  as  strong  as  that  near  Sal 
tillo — certainly  the  only  dangerous  points.  Victoria  was 
near  the  port  of  Soto  la  Marina,  whence  all  requisite 
stores  could  be  drawn.  Parras  was  in  a  productive  re 
gion,  affording  supplies  and  guarding  the  right  flank. 
Tampico,  near  the  Gulf  coast,  was  equally  important,  for 
similar  reasons,  on  our  left.  The  objection,  therefore,  of 
spreading  the  troops  over  a  line  of  "  600  miles,"  would 
have  been  obviated,  and  likewise,  that  of  the  equidistance 
of  all  the  parts  from  San  Louis,  by  which,  it  is  true,  in  an 
open  country,  the  enemy  could  have  attacked  and  over 
whelmed  our  detachments  in  detail.  Now,  early  in  Jan 
uary,  Taylor  had  ample  forces  at  Victoria  to  hold  that 
place  and  the  adjacent  defiles.  At  Saltillo,  including 
Wool's  command,  he  had  more  than  he  carried  into  action 
on  the  23d  of  February,  with  which  he  resisted  the  army 
of  Santa  Anna.  But  had  Wool  continued  at  Parras,  there 
were  other  reinforcements,  intended  by  Taylor  (see  letter 
of  the  8th  of  December,)  for  Saltillo,  and  as  Wool  per- 


*  Lieut.  Meade  had  examined  some  of  these  passes,  and  found  them  im 
practicable.  Henry's  "  Sketches,"  vol.  2d,  p.  290.  And  Capt.  Limard,  es 
corted  by  May's  dragoons,  had  reconnoitcred  others,  with  like  result 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  19 

formed  the  march  between  the  places  in  less  than  two 
days,  (his  cavalry  and  artillery  40  miles  a  day,)  he  was 
within  striking  distance,  in  case  of  alarm.  For  a  defen 
sive  line,  Taylor's  plan  was  consequently  wise,  and  in 
every  way  calculated  to  effect  his  purposes.  Additionally, 
his  reserves  were  posted  at  Monterey,  nearest  the  Angos 
tura  pass,  which  he  regarded  the  only  dangerous  point  of 
the  line.  On  the  contrary,  if,  instead  of  defence,  it  were 
designed  to  advance  on  San  Louis,  his  operations  were 
equally  judicious,  since  it  was  necessary  to  cover  all  the 
country  that  was  essential  to  the  security  of  his  army 
and  of  his  line  of  communication.  It  is  really  hypercri- 
ticism  to  denounce  these  arrangements  ;  it  is  like  advan 
cing  certain  rules  of  war  that  are  entirely  inapplicable  to 
the  case,  and  reminds  us  of  the  charge  against  General 
Scott,  in  1836,  that  he  introduced  all  the  parade  and  the 
grand  evolutions  of  European  armies,  in  his  operations 
against  the  Seminole  Indians,  and  about  as  reasonably 
advanced,  in  this  instance,  as  would  have  been  such  ope 
rations. 

The  President,  however,  determined  upon  a  different 
policy.  He  would  not  desist  from  all  effort,  on  occupying 
a  section,  not  vital,  of  the  enemy's  country — he  aimed  not 
at  a  quasi-peace,  liable  to  be  broken  monthly,  and  requi 
ring  large  expenditure,  without  adequate,  or  indeed,  any 
return,  for  hostilities  would  not  have  ceased  ;  but  he  de 
manded  a  firm  treaty,  negotiated  and  fixed  by  legitimate 
governmental  authorities,  and,  to  procure  it,  resorted  to 
other,  and  more  vigorous  and  compulsory  measures,  than 
a  defensive  line. 

Several  events  occurred,  about  this  period,  which  en 
tirely  deranged  Taylor's  contemplated  schemes.  One  was 
an  alarm  at  Saltillo,  on  the  19th  of  December.  Worth 
was  there  with  1200  men  (fewer  effectives)  and  8  guns. 
The  enemy,  within  the  town,  conceived  the  conquest  of 
them  easy,  and  the  governor  of  the  state  (province  ?)  ex 
pressed  his  hopes,  in  a  dispatch  to  the  Mexican  command 
er,  whose  cavalry  was  within  60  miles,  requested  an  attack 
on  us,  and  promised  the  co-operation  of  the  citizens  of 
the  place,  numbering  in  population  from  15  to  20,000.* 
The  courier — one  at  least — was  captured,  and  his  papers 
sent  to  Worth,  who,  apprehending  a  serious  movement 

*  Henry,  vol.  2d,  p.  245. 


20  Battle  of  Bucna  Vista. 

against  his  small  command,  called  for  reinforcements. 
Wool  marched  his  forces,  with  praiseworthy  expedition, 
to  Worth's  assistance.  Twiggs'  division,  on  the  march  to 
Victoria,  was  recalled,  and  returned  to  Monterey.  Butler, 
with  two  regiments  of  volunteers,  advanced  rapidly  from 
the  last  place,  and  the  2d  Kentucky  regiment  made  a  cre 
ditable  march,  from  Camargo  to  Monterey.  With  this 
concentration  of  troops,  the  alarm  was  dispelled.  As  a 
consequence,  however,  Parras  was  definitely  abandoned, 
and  Wool  was  retained  in  the  vicinity  of  Saltillo.  Tay 
lor,  in  the  mean  time,  retraced  his  way  towards  Victoria. 
Other  occurrences  were,  that  Gen.  Scott  arrived  at  the 
Brazos  on  the  28th  of  December,  began  his  preparations 
for  the  descent  on  Vera  Cruz,  made  a  requisition  on  Tay 
lor  for  nearly  all  his  regular,  and  a  large  portion  of  his 
volunteer  troops,  and  advised  him  to  fall  back  on  Monte 
rey  and  assume  the  defensive.  In  a  letter  to  Scott,  of  the 
4th  of  January,  Ib47,  the  Secretary  of  War  made  a  simi 
lar  recommendation.  Worth,  under  orders  from  Scott,  of 
the  3d  January,  received  through  Butler,  marched  his 
division  from  Saltillo  on  the  9th.  It  numbered,  by  his 
own  report,  including  those  to  be  attached  en  route,  in  the 
aggregate,  2,666.  Twiggs'  division,  of  1,465,  followed, 
the  next  day,  by  3,268  volunteers  under  Patterson,  moved 
from  Victoria  for  Tampico,  on  the  14th.  Ripley  makes, 
at  this  point,  another  of  his  unfair  allusions  to  Taylor, 
vol.  1,  p.  340.  Opposed  to  the  propriety  of  occupying 
Victoria,  he  remarks  that  Taylor  was  forced, by  the  "state 
of  his  supplies,"  to  evacuate  the  "  newly  occupied  town." 
The  fact  is  as  given,  but  there  was  a  reason  for  it,  which 
a  candid  historian  would  have  offered  ;  but,  not  desiring 
to  do  justice,  it  was  withheld,  since  we  will  not  suppose 
him  ignorant.  Taylor  had  concentrated  at  Victoria,  on 
the  4th  of  January,  and,  learning  from  Scott's  letter,  of 
the  25th  November,  from  New- York,  received  21th  of 
December,  that  a  portion  of  his  troops  were  to  be  taken 
from  him,  he  suspended  his  operations,  in  a  good  degree, 
and  awaited  farther  instructions.  He  was  thus  in  statu 
until  the  14th  of  January,  when  Scott's  orders  of  the  3d 
arrived.  On  that  day  his  troops  moved  for  Tampico,  an 
excellent  position  for  Scott's  designs.  The  "state  of  sup 
plies  "  was  an  element  in  this  decision,  because  he  looked 
daily  for  an  order  to  divide  his  army,  and,  accordingly, 
had  neither  continued  arrangements  for  the  defensive  line, 


Battle  of  Buena.  Vista.  21 

nor  established  his  depot,  of  provisions,  etc.,  at  Soto  la 
Marina,  as  previously  contemplated.  It  is  plain  that  he 
could  not  have  acted  more  judiciously,  and,  indeed,  any 
different  course  might  have  proved  unwise. 

Other  troops  joined  Scott,  from  the  Rio  Grande,  and 
Taylor  was  left  with  1000  regulars,*  and  a  volunteer 
force  of  some  6000  men,  partly  new  levies,  to  protect  his 
extensive  line,  threatened  by  Santa  Anna  and  20,000  or 
more  men  in  front. 

Ripley  sneers  at  the  complaint,  made  by  Taylor  to 
Scott,  for  this  large  withdrawal  of  force,  and  charges 
inconsistency,  because  the  former  said,  subsequently — the 
27th  of  January,  at  Monterey — that  the  troops  "left  him 
in  that  quarter  would  doubtless  enable  him  to  hold  the 
positions  then  occupied."  And  he  gives  the  noble  old 
soldier  no  credit  whatever  for  his  previous  offer,  sponta 
neously  made,  to  place  a  large  portion  of  the  army  at 
Scott's  command,  for  the  coast  expedition.  The  truth  is, 
he  objected  at  last,  less  to  the  deprivation  of  force,  than 
to  the  number  of  his  veterans  taken,  and  the  manner  of 
the  act — having  been  kept  in  ignorance  of  the  plans  of 
the  government,  and  deeming  it  preposterous,  as  intimated 
in  the  letter  of  25th  of  November,  (Ex.  Doc.  number  60, 
p.  373,)  that  he  should  be  expected  to  take  the  offensive, 
in  the  month  of  March,  with  his  impaired  and  diminished 
army.  And  is  it  strange  that,  at  the  first  view — when 
almost  in  despair  at  his  position,  and  speaking  heroically 
of  carrying  "  out,  in  good  faith,  the  views  of  the  govern 
ment,  though  he  may  be  sacrificed  in  the  effort,"  and  feel 
ing  that  he  had  lost  its  confidence — that  he  should  fear 
the  inadequacy  of  his  means  to  maintain  himself?  And 
when,  a  fortnight  later,  he  had  looked  around — acquired 
new  resolution — conceived  that  Santa  Anna  and  the  main 
body  of  the  enemy  would  move  against  Scott  rather  than 
himself — and  perceived  that  he  was  only  expected  to  de 
fend  his  line  as  far  as  Monterey,  is  it  very  absurd,  that, 
like  an  undaunted  soldier,  as  he  was,  he  should  express 

*  Taylor's  letter  to  Scott,  January  15th,  1847.  Ex.  Doc.  number  60,  page 
863.  We  will  say,  of  this  document,  that  it  is  most  vilely  compiled.  Scarcely 
half  a  dozen  letters  ever  occur  successively,  according  to  dates.  To  search 
for  those  required,  through  a  disarray  of  1277  pages,  demands  as  much  time, 
and  much  more  patience,  than  to  have  written  them  all.  Scott,  in  his  letter  of 
the  3d  of  January,  supposes  that  Taylor  would  still  have  2000  regulars — an 
error  to  be  attributed  to  the  want  of  returns. 


22  Battle,  of  Buena  Vista. 

the  hope  that  he  could  hold  his  ground  ?  Instead  of  blame, 
we  would  accord  to  him  high  praise.  And  we  want  terms 
to  convey  our  admiration,  at  the  grand  effort  of  self-con 
trol,  which  prompted  and  qualified  his  letter  to  Scott,  of 
the  15th  January,  when  he  learned  the  full  extent  of  the 
reduction  of  his  forces.  Napoleon  threw  up  his  commis 
sion  in  Italy  for  a  less  cause  !  Away  with  the  denuncia 
tory  opinions,  based  upon  a  bitter  prejudice,  that  fancies 
"  no  good  can  come  out  of  Nazareth  !" 

Taylor  evacuated  Victoria,  restricted  his  line  to  the 
river,  and,  from  Camargo,  via  Monterey,  to  Saltillo,  and, 
on  the  24th  of  January,  established  his  head  quarters  at 
Monterey.  He  disregarded  the  advice  of  Scott  and  the 
Secretary  of  War,  to  abandon  Saltillo,  for  the  following 
reasons,  given  in  his  letter  of  the  7th  of  February,  1847  : 
"  Not  to  speak  of  the  pernicious  moral  effect,  upon  volun 
teer  troops,  of  falling  back  from  points  which  we  have 
gained,  there  are  powerful  military  reasons  for  occupying 
this  extreme  of  the  pass  rather  than  the  other.  The 
scarcity  of  water  and  supplies,  for  a  long  distance  in 
front,  compels  the  enemy  either  to  risk  an  engagement  in 
the  field,  or  hold  himself  aloof  from  us  ;  while,  if  we  fall 
back  on  Monterey,  he  could  establish  himself  strongly  at 
Saltillo,  and  be  in  position  to  annoy  more  effectually  our 
flanks  and  communications."  It  may  be  added,  that,  hold 
ing  the  Angostura,  through  which,  alone,  artillery  could 
move  towards  the  Rio  Grande,  the  line  of  communication 
was  comparatively  secure.  And  also,  if  defeated  in  this 
position,  there  were  almost  impregnable  passes  to  fall 
back  on,  in  the  retreat  to  Monterey,  where  the  struggle, 
with  reinforcements  from  the  rear,  might  be  again  and 
again  renewed  ;  and  the  enemy  would  be  kept  longer 
engaged  in  the  north,  while  Scott  would  more  surely  find 
an  open  highway  to  the  capital. 

News  arrived,  on  the  30th  of  January,  that  Majors 
Borland  and  Games'  command,  of  70  aggregate,  had  been 
captured  by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  at  Encarcacion,  55  miles 
south  of  Saltillo,  on  the  20th,  while  reconnoitering  ;  and 
also,  that  Capt.  Hardy  and  17  men  had  been  taken  by 
rancheros,  in  the  same  direction,  on  the  27th.  Taylor  the 
next  day  hastened  from  Monterey  to  his  advanced  posts, 
and,  on  the  5th  of  February,  fixed  his  head  quarters  at 
Aqua  Nueva,  beyond  the  pass  of  Angostura  or  Buena 
Vista,  and  18  miles  south  of  Saltillo."  By  the  14th,  his 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  23 

forces  were  assembled  in  that  quarter,  and  he  was  rapidly 
procuring  ample  supplies  for  his  army.  Yet,  even  at  that 
date,  notwithstanding  the  capture  of  his  parties  indicated 
the  presence  of  the  enemy  in  considerable  force,  Taylor 
did  not  anticipate  an  advance,  on  their  part,  and  was  an 
ticipating  (see  official  letter)  the  arrival  of  new  regiments, 
to  enable  him  to  make  a  diversion,  to  favour  Scott.  It 
was  not  until  the  21st  that  he  was  confident  there  would 
be  an  attack  upon  him,  and  he  ordered  up  Gen.  Mar 
shall's*  troops,  including  Capt.  Prentiss'  battery  of  eigh 
teen  pounders,  from  the  Rinconada. 

The  question,  whether  Santa  Anna  should  have  march 
ed  against  Scott  or  Taylor,  has  been  a  good  deal  discussed, 
and  we  will  offer  our  views  in  this  place.  On  the  13th 
of  January,  Lieut.  Richey,  while  bearing  Scott's  letter  of 
the  3d,  among  others,  from  Monterey,  to  Taylor,  at  Vic 
toria,  was  lassoed  and  murdered  at  Villa  Gran.  His  pa 
pers,  including  this  requisition  for  troops,  and  the  plan  of 
the  descent  on  Vera  Cruz,  were  seized,  and  conveyed 
promptly  to  Santa  Anna,  at  San  Louis.  The  enemy  thus 
became  early  acquainted  with  our  designs,  and  Scott 
fully  expected  to  be  met  by  him,  in  great  force,  at  Vera 
Cruz  ;  while,  as  late  as  the  14th  of  February,  Taylor  did 
not  contemplate  a  battle  near  Saltillo.  Both  Generals 
were  deceived  ;  and  both  our  historians  (Ripley  and  Mans 
field)  argue  that  they  should  have  penetrated  the  inten 
tions  of  Santa  Anna — in  other  words,  that  the  latter  acted 
with  wisdom  in  the  course  he  pursued.  With  due  defe 
rence,  we  disagree  to  their  conclusion,  and  concur  in  the 
justness  of  the  conceptions  of  our  Generals — not  only  as 
the  circumstances  then  appeared  to  them,  but  judging  also 
after  the  event.  And,  while  our  limits  do  not  permit  a 
full  survey,  with  illustrations,  of  the  points  at  issue,  we 
will  yet  offer  concisely  a  few  considerations,  which  are 
conclusive  to  our  mind. 

1.  Santa  Anna,  at  San  Louis,  was  about  equi-distant 
from  Saltillo.  Vera  Cruz  and  Mexico.  He  commanded 
over  20,000  men — including  Minon  and  Urrea,  nearer 
30,000— leaving  5  or  6,000  in  observation  of  Taylor,  he 
could  have  reached  Vera  Cruz  by  the  middle  of  February, 
and,  on  the  wray,  have  recruited  as  many  more.  Having 

.  *  These  troops  arrived  early  on  the  24th,  and  were  in  readiness  for  Santa 
Anna,  had  he  renewed  the  battle  on  that  day. 


24  Battle  of  Buena  Vista. 

40,000  troops,  or  even  fewer,  he  could  have  easily  supplied 
and  strengthened  both  city  and  castle,  and,  in  all  proba 
bility,  have  repulsed  Worth  and  his  5,000  men,  when  they 
landed  on  the  beach. 

2.  Scott  had  the  larger  American  army,  and  aimed  to 
reduce  Vera  Cruz — the  high  road  to  the  capital  would  be 
open  to  him,  as  a  consequence — the  conquest  of  the  city 
of  Mexico  would  destroy  the  morale  of  the  people  and 
soldiery,  and  the  subjugation  of  the  country  must  inevita 
bly  follow.     It  was  Santa  Anna's  first  duty  to  protect  the 
more  vital  interest,  to  insure  safety  to  the  capital,  and 
meet  the  invader  at  the  coast,  rather  than  move  the  flower 
of  the  Mexican  army  in  the  opposite  direction,  and  attack 
in  a  remote  and  comparatively  insignificant  province. 

3.  The  morale  of  the  Mexicans  would  have  been  greatly 
more  elevated  by  defeating  at  Vera  Cruz  than  Saltillo,  for 
obvious  reasons — it  would  have  been  known  and  felt  im 
mediately  in  the  richest  and  most  populous  parts  of  the 
State — the  fact  would  have  been  indisputable,  because 
the  scene  was  near  enough  for  it  to  be  known  absolutely — 
and  the  grand  army  would  have  been  crippled  and  driven 
to  sea. 

4.  If  Santa  Anna  had  money  and  supplies  to  march 
against  Taylor,  the  same  would  have  enabled   him  to 
operate,  to  the  same  distance,  against  Scott,  and,  arriving 
among  a  wealthier  population,  near  his  own  home,  and 
nearer  the  capital,  where  Congress,  in  December,  had 
been  unanimous  for  the  continuance  of  war,  he  could 
largely  have  increased  both. 

5.  Had  Santa  Anna  forced  back  Taylor,  it  would  not 
have  been  a  Plassey  overthrow — the  latter  would  have 
rallied  at  the  Rinconada,  again  at  Monterey,  where  the 
siege  would  have  been  protracted,  or  better  fortune  have 
raised  it,  by  a  victory.     Santa  Anna  could  not  neglect 
and  pass  it  by.     New  regiments  would  have  been  on  the 
line,  in  season  to  aid  in  defence  against  detachments,  and 
the  movement  would  have  failed  of  important  results ; 
while  Scott  would  have  encountered  little  resistance  in 
his  march  to  the  capital. 

6.  A  few  thousand  troops,  to  manoeuvre  in  front  of 
Taylor,  were  sufficient.     The  route  to  San  Louis  was  full 
of  difficulties — the  water  tanks  were  already  destroyed — 
and   the   knowledge   of   Taylor's    diminished   command 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  25 

should  have  induced  the  belief  that  no  advance  was  con 
templated  on  his  part.  -x^-~ 

7.  Santa  Anna  did  no/reason  from  the  past.  Arista,  in 
his  chosen  position,  with  odds  of  4  to  1,  and  having  fine 
troops,  too,  was  disastrously  defeated.  He  knew,  through 
his  spies  at  Saltillo,  that  Taylor's  force  was  about  in  the 
same  proportion — knew  the  Angostura,  where  he  might 
be  met  to  advantage — from  sad  experience  with  the  Tex- 
ans,  should  have  known  that  he  could  not  annihilate  Tay 
lor,  and  therefore,  could  not  promptly  control  his  commu 
nications,  and  threaten  an  advance  to  the  Rio  Grande — 
and  he  should  have  calculated  the  effect,  to  his  country,  of 
the  failure  of  his  operation. 

The  Mexican  historians,  after  the  event,  it  is  true,  but 
with  knowledge  of  Santa  Anna's  means  and  designs,  de 
nounce  his  course  without  qualification.  At  p.  Ill,  they 
say,  "  Considering  these  things,  under  this  point  of  view, 
the  battle  of  the  Angostura  was  for  us  the  loss  of  the 
capital,  and  would  also  have  been,  even  if  a  victory  had 
been  the  result  of  that  action.  Its  importance  to  the 
Americans  was  great,  and  would  have  been  great,  what 
ever  had  been  its  issue." 

Even  up  to  the  20th  of  February,  there  was  no  certain 
knowledge  of  the  approach  of  Santa  Anna  ;  but,  on  that 
day,  Col.  May,  with  400  men  and  2  guns,  was  serft  to  La 
Hedionda,  to  reconnoitre  the  valley  around  Potosi  ha- 
-cienda,  at  which,  it  was  supposed  that  Minon  and  his 
2000  cavalry  were  posted,  and  ascertain  if  the  enemy 
were  advancing  through  the  Palomas  pass,  which  de 
bouched  to  the  north  of  Saltillo.  And  Major  McCulloch, 
with  his  Texan  spies,  was  ordered,  on  similar  duty,  to 
Encarnacion.  May  saw  none  of  the  enemy,  but  a  Mexi 
can  informed  him,  at  night,  that  Santa  Anna  was  moving 
from  the  latter  place,  to  attack  Taylor  on  the  following 
day.  To  be  in  at  the  fight,  May  marched  all  night,  with 
great  celerity,  making  60  miles  in  less  than  21  hours,  and 
at  dawn  communicated  his  intelligence  to  Taylor.  Mc 
Culloch  returned  the  same  morning,  and  confirmed  its 
truth,  excepting  the  probability  of  Santa  Anna's*  having 
marched  forward.  Both  these  officers  conducted  their 
commands  with  consummate  prudence  and  skill. 

*  Col.  Jefferson  Davis,  in  his  speech  of  5th  of  August,  1850,  in  the  Senate, 
says,  that  the  movement  to  Buena  Vista  was  determined  upon,  and  commenced 
before  the  return  of  McCulloch. 


26  Battle  of  Buena  Vista. 

It  was  determined  immediately  to  withdraw  from  Aqua 
Nueva,  and  take  position  near  the  hacienda  of  Buena 
Vista.  The  former  place  offered  the  advantage  of  receiv 
ing  the  enemy,  after  a  long  march,  without  water ;  but 
this  was  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  possibility  of 
its  being  turned,  by  either  flank,  and  our  communication 
intercepted.  The  face  of  the  pass,  near  Buena  Vista, 
presented  serious  obstacles  to  the  efficient  action  of  the 
Mexican  cavalry  and  artillery — his  favourite  arms — and 
enclosed  between  mountains,  was  highly  favourable  to 
the  resistance  of  a  small  to  a  large  force.  Accordingly, 
on  the  same  day,  our  army  retired  there  and  encamped.* 
The  stores  remaining  were  guarded,  and  to  be  removed 
as  promptly  as  practicable,  by  Yell  and  his  regiment,  with 
orders  to  burn  the  hacienda  and  all  within,  in  case  there 
was  danger  of  being  cut  off.  His  picquets  were  fired  on 
the  same  night.  He  set  fire  to  the  buildings,  dispatched 
his  wagons  at  great  speed,  saw  the  stores  destroyed,  (those 
not  carried  to  the  rear,)  and  proceeded  to  the  main  body, 
near  the  Angostura.  Santa  Anna  had  anticipated  a  sur 
prise.  Disappointed  in  this,  he  construed  our  retirement 
into  a  precipitate  retreat,  and,  without  permitting  his 
troops  to  recover  from  the  fatigue  of  a  forced  march,  or 
even  to  satisfy  their  thirst,  pressed  forward  eagerly,  with 
the  full*  expectation  of  cutting  us  to  pieces.  He  thus 
rushed,  by  elated  hopes,  into  the  Thermopylae,  from  which, 
had  he  desired,  he  could  not  withdraw  honourably,  with 
out  risking  a  battle.  Minon  moved,  the  same  day,  (22d,) 
through  the  pass  of  Palomas  Adentro,  opening  near  Sal- 
tillo,  to  the  east  of  which  he  posted  his  2000  cavalry,  to 
obstruct  our  retreat,  after  being  forced.  1000  rancheros, 
armed  with  long  knives,  were  stationed  on  the  west  of 
the  road,  to  aid  in  the  butchery ;  and  Urrea,  with  his  bri 
gade,  had  traversed  the  defiles  of  Tula,  and  was  in  the 
vicinity  of  Monterey.  Taylor  had  hastened  to  Saltillo,  on 
the  21st,  to  place  it  in  a  proper  state  of  defence,  and  the 
command  was  left  with  Wool.  The  glorious  22d  of  Feb 
ruary,  the  birth-day  of  the  illustrious  Washington,  broke 
upon  the  hostile  array.  Under  a  national  air,  and  amid 
the  high  inspiration,  to  the  army,  of  the  day  and  the  oc 
casion,  Wool  advanced  the  troops  to  the  field  of  combat. 

*  Except  Hardin's  Illinois  regiment,  which  halted  at  La  Angostura,  one 
mile  and  a  half  south  of  Buena  Vista. 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  27 

With  the  aid  of  Inspector  Churchill,  an  estimable  officer, 
and  perhaps  under  general  directions  from  Taylor,  they 
were  arranged  in  order  of  battle.  Before  these  disposi 
tions  were  completed,  the  Mexicans  made  their  appear 
ance — halted  beyond  the  range  of  our  fire — perceived  our 
resolution  to  face  the  music  of  war — and  prepared  at  once 
for  the  conflict.  Taylor,  learning  their  arrival — without 
finishing  his  preparations  at  Saltillo — returned  to  meet 
the  greater  danger.  He  approved  the  positions  of  the 
troops — received  Santa  Anna's  audacious  summons,  to 
surrender  at  discretion,  only  allowed  because  "  his  parti 
cular  esteem  was  deserved" — and  returned  the  celebrated 
answer,  brief,  simple,  modest,  yet  calm  with  undaunted 
resolution,  and  firm  as  the  base  of  the  Sierra  Madre. 

The  scene  of  the  mighty  struggle  which  followed  lies 
at  a  point  of  the  pass  a  mile  and  a  half  south  of  Buena 
Vista,  and  near  seven  miles  from  Saltillo.  This  pass, 
varying  in  width  from  one  and  a  half  to  four  miles,  and 
just  here  about  three  miles  across,  extended  from  Saltillo 
to  La  Encantada,  some  12  or  14  miles.  The  stream  flow 
ing  between  these  places  was,  at  this  point,  nearly  equi 
distant  from  the  mountains,  rising  2  or  3000  feet,  on  either 
hand,  and  the  road  ran  not  far  from  its  border.  La  An 
gostura,  "  the  Narrows,"  is  formed  by  a  high  bluff,  the 
jutting  extremity  of  the  spur  of  the  mountain,  on  one 
side,  and  the  stream,  with  steep  banks,  on  the  other,  which 
restricted  the  pass  to  the  width  of  an  ordinary  highway. 
Our  right  flank  was  protected  by  a  net-work  of  gullies, 
washed  by  the  stream,  over  20  feet  deep,  with  precipitous 
sides,  which  extended  nearly  to  the  mountain,  and  was 
deemed  impassable,  certainly  by  artillery,  if  not  for  all 
arms.  After  a  movement  of  observation  on  their  part, 
which  was  checked,  the  enemy  made  no  attempts  over 
this  lower  level,  and  the  battle  ground,  greatly  to  our 
advantage,  was  limited  to  the  eastern  level,  a  mile  and  a 
half  across,  and  about  sixty  feet  higher.  There  were 
several  spurs  of  the  mountain  on  this  side,  running  down 
to  the  road,  with  intervening  ravines,  difficult  of  passage. 
The  principal  one,  terminating  in  a  narrow  ridge  at  An 
gostura,  difficult  of  ascent  there,  and  commanding  the 
road  for  a  good  distance,  widened,  towards  its  base,  in  a 
south-eastern  direction,  into  a  plateau — the  plateau — some 
four  hundred  yards  across,  nearest  the  road,  and  two 
hundred  at  the  mountain.  This  plateau  was  broken,  or 


28  Battle  of  Bucna  Vista. 

scalloped,  as  you  proceeded  south,  by  three  gorges,  open 
ing  upon  the  road,  and  increasing  in  length  as  you  ad 
vanced.  Beyond,  were  a  ridge,  and  another  broad  ravine 
or  valley,  the  head  of  which  could  be  turned — and  still 
another  succeeded.  In  the  rear,  there  was  one  extending 
to  the  mountain,  behind  which  were  two  others,  succes 
sively,  with  numerous  minor  branches.  These  constitute 
the  striking  features  of  the  field,*  and  may  enable  the 
reader  to  derive  a  tolerable  idea  of  the  battle,  from  a 
general  description. 

Taylor's  force  consisted  of,  aggregate,!  3,406  volunteer 
infantry,  including  368  Mississippi  riflemen:  809  volunteer 
cavalry,  and  209  U.  S.  dragoons,  in  all,  1018  cavalry,  and 
16  field  pieces  of  artillery,  Washington's  horse  battery,  8 
guns,  Sherman's  and  Bragg's,  each  4  guns,  and  267  officers 
and  men  to  work  them  !  Total,  4691, J  without  a  single 
regular  infantry  soldier,  and  with  an  aggregate  of  regular 
troops,  of  476  ! 

Santa  Anna's  army  was  composed  of  17,600  infantry, 
artillerymen,  etc. — 4338  cavalry,  excluding  Minon's  2000 
cavalry,  at  Saltillo,  and  his  1000  rancheros  butchers — and 
20  guns,  ranging  from  8  to  24  pounders.  Total,  21,338, 
and,  simply  to  be  mentioned,  3000  seven  miles  in  our  rear. 
The  Mexican  historians,  calculated  by  their  translator, 
place  the  number  at  20,553,  including  the  23  GENERALS§ — 
which  the  bearer  of  Santa  A! ma's  summons  impressed 
upon  those  who  received  him — and  39  guns. 


*  There  was  some  discussion  about  the  claimants  to  the  selection  of  this 
field.  Butler,  Wool,  and  Capt.  Hughes,  T.  E  ,  each  (or  through  friends)  pre 
ferred  their  right  to  the  honour.  At  length,  however,  the  weight  of  evidence 
confers  it  upon  Wool  But  it  is  of  little  consequence.  Taylor  approved  it,  if 
he  did  not  know  of  it  before  the  crisis  arrived.  He  determined  to  hold  Sal 
tillo— it  was  natural  to  choose,  having  the  time,  that  position,  at  or  in  the  vici 
nity  of  the  town,  upon  which  the  enemy  could  be  received  to  most  advantage, 
and  we  imagine  that  no  military  eye  would  have  glanced  over  the  ground, 
without  perceiving  its  strong  points,  and  other  advantages  for  battle.  Yet,  if 
any  special  credit  is  due  to  General  Wool,  let  it  be  fully  rendered. 

•f  Aggregate — the  word  includes  officers.     It  is  technical. 

J  Henry  says  4,425  men  and  334  officers — total,  4,759.  Ripley  says,  4,425 
bayonets  and  sabres,  and  15  light  guns.  He,  perhaps,  excludes  the  6  pounder 
captured  at  Monterey,  attached  to  Washington's  company,  and  lost  by  O'Brien. 
Mansfield,  who  is  always  general,  says  about  5,000  men.  All  are  nr:> 
mark.  We  have  chosen  Carleton's  statement,  who  had  equal  access  to  all  the 
returns,  and  seems  exceedingly  careful  in  his  figures.  Yet,  in  none  of  the 
reports  have  we  seen  a  return  of  the  Texas  mounted  company,  which,  on  the 
23d,  took  post  to  the  right,  and  in  rear  of  S  teen's  dragoons. 

§  Carleton. 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  29 

Washington's  battery  was  stationed  at  La  Angostura, 
which  was  our  extreme  right,  on  the  23d.  Hardin's  regi 
ment  supported  it — a  portion  behind  a  parapet,  on  the 
tongue  of  land  above,  and  the  remainder  entrenched  near 
the  guns.  It  was  also  supported  by  McKee's  Kentuck- 
ians,~k^the  crest  of  a  knoll  in  the  rear.  Bissell  was  on 
the  plateau,  with  his  2d  Illinois  regiment,  and  an  associa 
ted  company  of  Texan  foot.  At  the  base  of  the  moun 
tain,  the  farther  side  of  the  plateau,  was  posted  the  volun 
teer  cavalry.  The  other  troops  were  in  reserve,  on  a 
ridge  in  rear  of  that  which  Hardin  occupied.  Santa 
Anna's  forces  were  drawn  up  in  two  lines  of  infantry, 
with  batteries  on  their  flanks,  the  cavalry  behind  them, 
and  the  general  park  in  rear,  guarded  by  lancers,  and 
posted  on  a  ridge  in  our  front,  with  a  higher  one  interve 
ning.  His  first  aim  was  to  occupy  the  slope  of  the  moun 
tain,  ascending  from  the  plateau,  on  our  left,  and,  for  the 
purpose,  dispatched  Ampudia,  with  his  four  battalions  of 
light  infantry.  Perceiving  the  design,  Taylor  directed  a 
portion  of  the  cavalry  to  dismount,  and,  reinforced  by  some 
Indiana  troops,  all  armed  with  rifles,  and  commanded  by 
Marshall,  to  ascend  the  opposite  slope  (a  gorge  between) 
and  resist  them.  O'Brien,  with  3  pieces  from  Washington's 
battery,  sustained  by  Bowies'  regiment,  was  ordered  in  sup 
port.  A  shell,  thrown  from  a  Mexican  howitzer,  announced, 
at  3  P.  M.,  the  commencement  of  the  combat.  Ampudia 
and  Marshall  begun,  and  continued  their  sharp-shooting 
and  efforts  to  out-flank  each  other,  until  dark,  with  trifling 
loss  on  our  side,  (4  wounded)  but  a  good  deal  of  slaughter 
from  our  marksmen — 300  killed  and  wounded.  With  this 
skirmishing,  and  an  occasional  cannonade  at  our  troops 
on  the  plateau,  precluded  by  the  distance  from  a  reply, 
ended  the  affair  of  that  day.  An  apparent  intention  of 
Santa  Anna  looking  to  our  right  also,  induced  Taylor  to 
send  Bragg  and  McKee's  regiment  to  an  elevated  ground 
in  the  rear  of  the  net- work  of  gullies,  where  they  passed 
the  night.  Feeling  sure  the  enemy  would  postpone  his 
grand  attack  until  morning,  the  General  went  again  to 
Saltillo  for  the  night,  in  order  to  complete  his  arrange 
ments  there  for  security. 

On  the  23d  our  dispositions  were  slightly  altered.  Wash 
ington  remained  as  before.  Ampudia  having  been  strength 
ened  by  2000  infantry,  a  battalion  of  riflemen  (Illinois  and 
Texas)  was  ordered  to  join  Marshall,  still  on  the  moun- 


30  Battle  of  Buena  Vista. 

tain  side.  Bissell  was  on  the  plateau,  opposite  the  head 
of  the  second  gorge,  with  a  gun  on  each  flank — Steen's 
squadron  to  the  right  and  rear  of  them — and  McCulloch's 
mounted  Texans  to  their  right  and  rear.  Bowies'  2d,  and 
O'Brien's  3  pieces,  on  the  left  of  the  plateau — Lane's  3d 
on  the  knoll  behind  Washington — while  the  volunteer 
cavalry  was  in  the  ravine  near  the  plateau,  and  near  the 
mountain.  The  others  were  where  the  previous  night 
had  found  them. 

The  Mexicans  were  formed  in  three  columns  of  attack  : 
the  first,  under  Villamel,  to  carry  La  Angostura  ;  the  se 
cond,  under  Lombardini,  to  skirt  the  mountain  and  force 
our  left ;  the  third,  under  Pacheco,  to  pass  up  the  third 
gorge,  and  unite  with  the  second  in  its  object ;  Ampudia 
was  to  clear  the  mountain,  and  join  the  others,  for  a  com 
bined  assault  in  reverse,  or  upon  our  rear.  The  three 
first  were  accompanied  by  strong  bodies  of  cavalry.  The 
12  pounders  and  howitzer  were  placed  on  an  eminence, 
in  front  of  "  the  Narrows,"  to  aid  Villamel ;  the  8  pound 
ers  were  on  a  ridge  near  the  mountain,  beyond  the  broad 
ravine,  having  a  plunging  fire  on  the  plateau.  Ortega 
commanded  the  powerful  reserve. 

At  the  earliest  dawn,  the  mountain  forces  began  their 
work,  and  briskly  kept  it  up.  Our  main  body  quietly 
awaited  the  onset  of  the  formidable  columns.  On  they 
came,  marching  as  on  parade,  in  beautiful  array,  and  with 
admirable  precision,  proving  their  instruction  and  their 
discipline.  Pacheco,  having  fewer  obstacles  of  ground, 
was  in  advance.  Bowies'  regiment  and  O'Brien's  guns 
were  beyond  the  third  gorge,  to  meet  him.  The  pieces 
were  vigorously  served,  and,  without  intermission,  vomited 
forth  their  destructive  hail.  To  avoid  the  enfilade  of  the 
8  pounder  battery,  he  now  facing  the  road,  General  Lane* 
ordered  him,  with  the  infantry  support,  still  farther  for 
ward,  and  again  he  poured  his  iron  missiles  (two  canisters 
at  a  charge)  into  the  serried  masses  of  the  foe.  Bowlesf 
misunderstood  the  order,  and  directed  his  men  to  "  cease 
firing,  and  retreat"  wrhich  they  did  with  all  speed,  fleeing 
from  the  field.  O'Brien  obeyed  Lane,  but  the  enemy  con 
tinued  to  advance — their  prostrated  platoons  were  re- 

*  There  were  a  General  and  a  Colonel  Lane  on  the  field 

f  Bowles  was  a  brave  man — he  fought  the  rest  of  the  day  with  a  musket. 

A  court  acquitted  him  of  cowardice,  but  not  of  dullness.     Paymaster  Dix 

gallantly  rallied  some  of  his  men. 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  31 

placed — their  numbers  were  overwhelming — while  our 
artillerists,  momently  thinned,  were  too  few  to  resist  them. 
When  almost  at  his  muzzles,  O'Brien,  much  crippled  in 
force,  retired  with  two  guns,  and  left  to  the  enemy  the 
third,  without  an  unwounded  man  or  horse  to  manage  it ! 
Nor,  on  reaching  support,  were  his  others  in  better  plight. 
During  this  conflict  of  25  minutes,  Villamil,  with  his  4000 
choice  troops,  marched  upon  La  Angostura  ;  but  a  few 
rounds  from  Washington's  splendid  battery  broke  the  head 
of  their  column,  and  drove  the  entire  mass  headlong  into 
the  broad  ravine,  for  security,  and  checked,  for  that  day, 
any  repetition  of  the  attempt  upon  that  point. 

Pacheco  reached  the  plateau  and  united  with  Lombar- 
dini — passing  near  four  companies  of  Arkansans,  they  too 
fled  the  field.  His  cavalry,  pursuing  Bowies'  Indiana 
regiment,  moved  near  the  base  of  the  mountain,  and  ex 
cited  in  our  riflemen  there  the  fear  of  being  cut  off,  and 
they,  together  with  the  volunteer  cavalry,  retreated. 
Pressed  by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  Ampudia,  who  de 
scended  the  slope,  great  loss  was  sustained,  and  the  Texas 
company*  was  nearly  destroyed.  The  masses  on  the  pla 
teau  now  maintained  their  position,  against  the  guns  of 
Sherman,  Bragg,  Thomas,  Garnett  and  O'Brien,  who  had 
exchanged  with  Washington  his  two  pieces,  and  promptly 
appeared  again  upon  the  scene.  The  artillery  was  formed 
across  the  plateau,  at  the  head  of  the  first  gorge,  and, 
supported  by  Hardin,  M'Kee  and  Bissell,  sent  a  storm  of 
iron  and  lead  against  the  enemy,  who  replied  with  un 
yielding  obstinacy. 

At  this  crisis,  our  left  forced  and  turned,  and  the  retiring 
tide  moving  upon  Buena  Vista,  and  our  centre  opposed  by 
tremendous  odds,  Taylor  returned  from  Saltillo,  (11  A.M.) 
and  assumed  a  conspicuous  place  on  the  plateau,  between 
the  north*  ravine  and  the  head  of  the  first  gorge.  At  this 
fearful  moment,  he  was  advised  to  fall  back — to  concen 
trate  and  occupy  new  ground — that  "  all  was  lost."  But  the 
courage  of  the  indomitable  chieftain  rose  with  the  occasion. 
Seeing  at  a  glance  the  condition  of  affairs,  he  replied,  "  No, 
WE  WILL  DECIDE  THE  BATTLE  HERE  !"  His  humanity,  too,  shrank 
from  the  butchery  of  his  comrades,  strown  over  the  field, 
and  he  said  also,  "I  WILL  NEVER,  ALIVE,  LEAVE  MY  WOUNDED 

*  A  Texas  Lieutenant  offered  his  sword  in  surrender — it  was  seized  and 
plunged  into  him. 


32  Battle  of  Buena  Vista. 

BEHIND  !"  Cheers  greeted  his  arrival  —  new  spirit  was  im 
parted  to  the  troops  —  confidence  was  re-awakened  by  the 
presence  of  that  brave  heart,  which  had  never  known 
defeat,  and  which  scorned  a  "surrender"  —  and  victory 
was  again  anticipated,  with  sanguine  hope. 

Davis*  saw  Ampudia's  command,  strengthened  by  ca 
valry,  moving  down  the  second  ridge,  behind  the  plateau, 
elated  with  conquest,  and,  asking  Wool  for  Lane's  regi 
ment  in  support,  he  turned  from  the  road,  with  his  368 
riflemen,  to  check  their  progress.  Advancing  to  a  minor 
branch  of  the  ravine,  on  his  right,  he  hurled  a  volley  into 
the  enemy  and  staggered  him,  his  cavalry  being  forced 
for  shelter  into  the  neighbouring  ravine.  Not  satisfied 
with  the  distance,  he  dashed  across  the  branch,  met  Am- 
pudia  face  TO  face,  and,  without  aid,  put  his  infantry  to 
flight,  in  a  disorganized  and  confused  multitude.  Seeking 
the  cavalry  under  cover,  a  few  of  whom  had  crossed  to 
charge  in  reverse,  never  to  return,  they  fled.  Returning 
along  the  ridge,  to  his  first  position,  Davis  was  joined  by 
Lane  and  Kilburn's  gun,  and,  forming  again  in  line,  await 
ed  events. 

Torrejon'sf  brigade  of  horse,  pursuing  the  retiring  for 
ces  farther  left,  was  received  by  them  at  Buena  Vista.  A 
shock  of  cavalry  ensuedj  —  the  enemy  were  divided  —  one 
portion  traversed  the  hacienda,  worried  by  the  deserters 
from  the  battle,  and  others  there,  and  crossed  the  western 
mountain  —  the  other  retreated  rapidly,  under  a  few  rounds 
from  Reynolds'  gun,  to  the  eastern  base.  The  dragoons, 
arrived  too  late  to  participate  in  the  struggle. 

A  fresh  body  of  cavalry,  1500  strong,  now  dashed 
down,  in  splendid  style,  to  overwhelm  Davis.  Forming 
an  angle,  opening  to  them  —  Lane  extending  to  the  ravine, 
on  his  right,  and  he  across  the  plain,  in  line  —  they  awaited 
the  charge  of  the  gaudy  lancers.  On  they  cairfc,  in  per 
fect  order,  at  an  easy  gallop,  expecting  a  discharge  of  our 
pieces,  at  long  range,  and  then  to  cut  us  up.  Disappoint 
ed,  they  drew  up  to  a  trot  —  not  a  shot  yet  —  at  80  yards 


*  Davis'  regiment  had  escorted  Taylor  from  Saltillo,  and  this  was  its  first 
appearance  that  day  on  the  field.  This  regiment  bad  fought  gallantly  at 
Monterey. 

f  This  brigade  contained  about  1000  men.  The  Kentucky  and  Arkansas 
cavalry,  in  this  affair,  numbered  about  450. 

\  Yell  was  killed  here,  and  Adjutant  Vaughan,  of  Kentucky,  under  24 
wounds 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  33 

they  halted  !  Then  simultaneously  pealed  the  rifle  and 
the  musket,  emptying  many  a  saddle,  and  followed  by  a 
deadly  "fire  by  file''  and  grape  and  canister  from  Sher 
man,  then  at  hand,  the  brilliant  troopers,  and  their  sup 
porting  infantry,  were  forced  back,  in  utter  confusion. 
Bragg  now  appeared,  with  3  guns — two  squadrons  of 
dragoons  and  one  of  Arkansans  marched  upon  the  ene 
my's  left  flank — and  all  advanced,  to  drive  him,  pell-mell, 
against  the  mountain. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  conflict  on  the  plateau  was  going 
on  obstinately,  and  with  doubtful  result.  At  length,  Santa 
Anna,  perceiving  that  his  centre  column  could  not  carry 
the  ground,  against  our  formidable  array  of  artillery,  or 
dered  up  the  San  Patricio  battalion,  (deserters  from  our 
army,)  with  a  battery  of  18  and  24  pounders,  to  mingle 
in  the  strife.  These  heavy  pieces  swept  the  entire  length 
of  the  plateau,  and  the  numerous  infantry  accompanied 
them  with  a  rapid  fire.  Had  the  reserves  been  brought 
forward  at  this  juncture,  the  day  would,  in  all  probability, 
have  been  gained.  The  omission  was  fatal.  At  last  they 
gave  way — their  masses  retired,  broken  in  the  middle — 
one  half  crossing  the  north  ravine,  to  aid  Ampudia  ;  the 
other  fell  back  to  the  ravine  in  front,  bearing  off  Santa 
Anna  himself.  The  heavy  battery  continued  at  the  head 
of  the  plateau,  and  opposed  to  them  were  the  guns  of 
O'Brien,  Thomas  and  Garnett/the  others  having  hastened 
to  the  aid  of  Davis,  then  in  the  crisis  of  his  daring  effort 

to  resist  cavalry  in  open  plain,  in  linejand  the  supporting  ^ x 

regiments  of  infantry,  which  advanced  in  pursuit  of  Santa 
Anna  and  his  defeated  and  retreating  column.  The  ene 
my  on  our  left  were  now  between  two  fires — Davis  and 
the  cavalry  on  their  left,  with  Bragg  literally  tearing  them 
to  pieces,  and  our  troops  on  the  plateau,  on  their  right, 
and  in  a  few  moments  6000  men  must  have  laid  down 
their  arms  ;  but  a  white  flag*  appeared,  Bearing  to  Tjayk>r~ 
the  inquiry,  what  did  he  want  ?  Generous  old  man,  jo 

*  The  Mexican  historians  make  a  romantic  affair  of  this  flag.  They  say 
an  officer  Mentega  became  "mived  up  with  the  Americans."  Objecting  to 
death  or  capture,  he  adopted  the  feint  for  his  own  security.  Carried  to 
Taylor,  he  returned  with  our  "  two  officers  of  the  army,"  who  went  for  an 
interview  with  Santa  Anna,  and  slipped  away,  unnoticed.  The  Other  Side, 
page  126.  They  say,  also,  that,  after  O'Brien  lost  his  gun,  some  persons  ap 
peared  before  Santa  Anna,  and,  as  from  Taylor,  demanded  his  surrender.  To 
which  "  original  request,"  that  chief,  with  dignity,  refused  to  accede."  Page 
ditto.  All  stuff-tf-the  American  translator  puts  it  right. 
3 


34  Battle  of  Buena  Vista. 

respond  to  such  an  absurdity !  He  silenced  all  our  guns, 
and  sent  Wool  to  confer  with  the  enemy.  Effecting  their 
purpose  of  escape,  they  would  not  cease  firing,  and  did  not 
receive  him.  A  happy  stratagem,  which  saved  one-third 
of  their  army. 

Santa  Anna  now  prepared  for  his  final  effort.  He  wit 
nessed  the  failure  on  our  left,  and  resolved,  in  the  absence 
of  much  of  our  force  in  that  quarter,  to  throw  an  ava 
lanche  of  troops  upon  our  centre.  He  moved  his  8  pound 
er  battery  nearer  to  the  scene — he  ordered  up  his  reserves, 
and,  under  Perez,  directed  them  to  the  plateau.  At  first, 
not  seeing  his  object,  O'Brien's  and  Thomas'  guns,  and 
Bissell,  McKee  and  Hardin,  were  far  in  front,  continuing 
their  advance  upon  the  fugitives  ;  but  orders  were  sent  to 
those  on  our  left  to  hurry  to  the  plateau.  Perez,  with  the 
reserves,  increased  now  to  12,000  men,  emerged  from  the 
ravine,  where  they  had  been  organized,  encountered  our 
advance — who,  driving  one  column,  dreamed  not  of  the 
approach  of  another  more  formidable — by  irresistible 
numbers  forced  our  infantry  to  give  way,*  and  finally  to 
seek  shelter  in  the  second  gorge.  Half  of  their  column 
enveloped  the  head  of  the  gorge  in  a  few  minutes,  passed 
down  its  sides,  and  slaughtered  many  brave  men,  without 
the  power  of  resistance,  and,  when  attempting  escape  by 
the  outlet  upon  the  road,  the  hostile  cavalry  were  there 
to  hem  them  in.  But  Washington,  in  a  moment,  dispersed 
these  last,  and  our  unfortunates  found  protection  under 
his  guns.  The  other  half — soon  joined  again  by  the 
first — pressed  across  the  plain,  having  only  O'Brien  and 
Thomos,  with  3  guns,  to  oppose  them — the  former  near  a 
hundred  yards  in  the  advance.  The  pieces  were  worked 
with  every  ability — the  enemy  approached  in  front — as 
sistance  was  coming  in  rear — if  O'Brien  withdrew  his 
guns,  they  might  sweep  over  the  plain  before  the  arrival 
of  succour — if  he  fought  until  they  reached  him  his  guns 
would  be  lost,  but  theV  would  be  temporarily  delayed — 

*  These  regiments  were  Hardin's,  Bissell's  and  McKee's,  the  last  entire,  the 
others  respectively  of  8  and  6  companies.  Two  of  the  former,  at  Saltillo,  and 
two  of  the  latter  there  also,  with  two  others,  detached  in  the  morning  to  re 
inforce  Marshall.  They  were  taken  rather  by  surprise — one  regiment  in  line, 
another  in  column  of  companies,  and  a  third  deploying  from  column  of  divi 
sions.  Hardin,  McKee  and  Clay  were  killed — the  enemy  made  no  prisoners 
on  that  field.  The  two  last  were  graduates  of  West  Point  Academy.  The 
first  was  not,  although  the  public  prints  have  asserted  it.  He  was  a  native 
of  Kentucky — a  resident  of,  and  had  been  in  Congress  from,  Illinois. 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  35 

aid  might  arrive,  and  the  day  might  yet  be  ours  !  With 
generous  heroism,  he  chose  the  last.  He  poured  into  them 
the  iron  hail — he  shot  down  their  leading  files  ;  but  on 
they  came  !  At  length,  with  four  or  five  wounded  men, 
he  loaded  again — the  enemy  almost  upon  him — gave  a 
last  fire,  with  marked  effect,  and  abandoned  his  guns.* 
At  that  instant,  Bragg,  under  whip  and  spur,  came  dash 
ing  up  the  ascent,  promptly  came  "  to  action"  and  plied 
that  glorious  battery  of  Ringgold's,f  with  a  celerity  and 
skill  never  surpassed.  He  asked  Taylor,  near  by,  for 
support.  "THERE  is  NONE," said  he,  "BUT  MAJOR  BLISS  AND 
MYSELF.  STAND  TO  YOUR  GUNS  AND  GIVE  THEM  (the  Mexi 
cans)  H !"J  And  Bragg,  like  a  well-trained  soldier, 

obeyed  him  to  the  letter !  At  only  fifty  paces — the  danger 
imminent — Thomas  alone  by  his  side,  he  outdid  all  his 
former  efforts.  He  tore  down  the  enemy  by  numerous 
lines — he  annihilated  the  leading  platoons — he  checked 
their  progress — they  recoiled.  Sherman  coming,  shoulder 
to  shoulder,  opened  a  hundred  other  avenues  of  death — 
they  reeled  to  and  fro.  Davis  and  Lane,  from  the  north 
ravine,  appearing  upon  their  right  flank,  delivered  a  well- 
directed  fire — and  the  column  yielded  ground,  and  finally 
rushed  from  the  field  !  The  day  was  won — "  victory 
perched  upon  our  standard  !"  With  the  removal  of  the 
enemy  beyond  our  fire  ended  the  great  combat,  and  ended, 
too,  in  many  respects,  the  most  brilliant  feat  of  arms  in 
American  history. §  The  enemy's  loss  was  about  2500, 


*  O'Brien  had  three  horses  shot  under  him,  and  was  wounded.  He  demand 
ed  a  court  of  inquiry,  to  investigate  the  causes  of  the  loss  of  his  guns:  Of 
course  there  was  but  one  opinion  ;  yet  it  prevented  all  after  controversy.  His 
guns  were  borne  off  by  the  Mexicans,  and  were  re -captured  by  his  own  regi 
ment,  at  Churubusco.  O'Brien  wrote  a  voluminous,  and,  for  reference,  a  va 
luable  work,  on  courts  martial.  He  died  of  cholera,  in  Texas,  in  1850. 

f  This  battery  was  carried  to  Texas  by  Ringgold,  was  fought  by  Ridgely, 
at  Resaca  and  Monterey,  and,  at  his  death,  turned  over  to  Bragg,  in  whose 
hands  its  reputation  was  certainly  not  diminished. 

\  It  was  said  that  Taylor  replied,  "  A  little  more  grape,  Captain  Bragg." 
A  good  catch  phrase,  but  not  true.  We  give  the  exact,  or  nearly  the  exact 
words  spoken,  as  we  heard  them  from  one  of  the  best  authorities. 

§  Some  cannonading  followed  the  retreat,  and  our  troops  pursued  the  ene 
my,  though  without  recovering  our  lost  guns  ;  but  the  day  was  really  over. 
We  have  omitted  many  details,  but  nothing  of  importance  bearing  on  the 
current  of  events.  And  we  omit  the  affair  at  Saltillo.  Fenr  infantry  compa 
nies,  under  Major  Warren,  and  an  artillery  company,  under  Captain  Webster, 
garrisoned  the  place.  Minon  made  an  attempt  there,  and  was  -repulsed. 
Lieut.  Shover,  with  a  6  pounder,  and  Lieut,  Benaldsen,  with  a  hewitser,  pur 
sued  him,  and  did  some  execution — all  very  gallantly. 


36  Battle  of  Btiena  Vista. 

killed  and  wounded,  and  several  thousand  missing.  On 
our  side,  there  were  272  killed,  388  wounded,  6  missing — 
in  all,  666. 

On  the  mere  perusal  of  an  account  of  this  battle,  the 
blood  courses  freer,  and  all  the  animal  energies  are  to  the 
utmost  aroused.  Like  Henry  Clay,  aftex-Mfin^fixey,  one 
feels  that  he,  too,  "  could  slay  an  enemy."  The  glory  of 
war  is  magnified,  the  daring  actors  in  its  scenes  of  hazard 
and  carnage  are  exalted  in  estimation,  and  we  become 
emulous  of  their  deeds  of  chivalry.  The  first  thought  to 
Dtrike  a  reflecting  mind  is,  how  was  it  won  ?  how  could 
it  be  won  with  such  disparity  of  force  ?  and,  more  parti 
cularly,  how  could  four  guns  of  light  artillery,  whatever 
the  skill  of  their  management,  stay  the  progress  of  12,000 
soldiers  ?  The  result  looks  like  the  effect  of  great  mag 
netic  power.  All  the  experience  of  war,  all  the  rules 
and  maxims  of  the  world's  chief  warriors,  and  all  the 
reasoning  upon  the  vast  difference  of  morale  between 
two  people  and  two  races,  would  have  argued  against 
the  possibility  of  victory,  to  sixty  men  at  most,  against 
such  immense  odds  !  How  loudly  it  speaks  for  the  tena 
cious  courage  and  the  unyielding  fortitude  of  the  Ameri 
can  soldier,  and  how  much  more  loudly  it  speaks  for  the 
unsuspected  efficiency  of  the  horse  artillery,  which  has 
been  brought  to  perfection  only  in  our  d**»  service.  That 
all  engaged  in  the  conflict — save  the  few  deserters — dis 
charged  their  duty,  is  not  to  be  doubted  ;  tKfcreeord  dis 
closes  the  naked  truth.  If  misfortunes,  under  fortuitous 
circumstances,  or  from  inability,  beset  many  of  them,  it 
was  not  their  fault.  Bravery,  enthusiasm,  perception  of 
the  consequences  of  defeat,  were  all  present,  to  impel 
them  to  superhuman  effort.  And ^ureVsj^  are/that  it  was 
exerted.  A  certain  arm  of  service  possessed  higher 
power ;  yet  its  success  could  carry  no  discredit  to  the 
failure  of  others. 

But  we  mean,  briefly^4t46-tuie,  to  notice  in  detail  some 
of  the  events  of  Buena  Vista,  including  the  dispositions 
of  the  parties,  and  will  indulge  in  few  abstract  or  decla 
matory  remarks.  Our  limits  and  design  exclude  such 
grateful  pastime,  and  restrict  to  severe  analysis,  and  dry, 
but,  it  is  hoped,  not  useless,  military  comments.  At  no 
period,  within  -neai4^70  years,  has  the  duty  been  more 
urgent  on  our  people  to  dwell  on  military  topics — to  dis 
cuss  questions  relating  to  war — to  acquire  and  digest  the 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  37 

approved  maxims,  and  to  set  in  progress  all  those  military 
preparations  dictated  by  a  wise  forecast ;  and,  if  hints 
are  offered,  here  and  there,  derived  from  study  of  the  best 
authorities,  they  may  not  prove  untimely  nor  unprofitable.  J^L 

The  Romans  always  formed  their  artfe^  of  battle  in  the 
same  manner.  They  encamped  in  an  entrenched  square, 
and,  when  about  to  engage  in  combat,  drew  out  their 
army  in  three  lines,  with  intervals  of  fifty  toises  (three  and 
a  half  feet  each)  between  them,  and  their  cavalry  on  the 
flanks.  From  the  restoration  of  the  true  military  system, 
under  Gustavus  Adolphus,  up  to  1792,  the  principles  and 
the  spirit  of  the  Roman  organization  and  line  of  battle 
were  observed.  The  experience  of  subsequent  wars,  and 
the  constant  direction  to  military  studies  of  so  many  and 
such  great  minds,  for  a  long  period,  produced  some  impor 
tant  changes,  and  tended  to  perfect  military  institutions. 
But  throughout  this  period,  of  more  than  20  centuries,  the 
"  orders  "*  of  battle,  variable,  to  a  degree,  with  the  gene 
ral,  and  somewhat  with  the  position,  have  undergone  little 
modification,  within  certain  limits,  and  we  find  the  one 
most  approved  at  the  present  day  the  same  that  was  suc 
cessful  at  Sparta  and  Thebes — the  oblique  order.  Napo 
leon  said  truly,  that  "  among  the  moderns  there  was  no 
natural  order,"  and  that  "  nothing  absolute  either  can  or 
ought  to  be  prescribed  ;"f  yet,  when  he  said  that  the 
oblique  order  was  "une  utopie  inapplicable,"  Jomini 
makes  issue  with  the  conqueror,  shows  that  many  of  his 
greatest  battles  were  gained  under  it,  and  leaves  the  im 
pression  that  the  ''line"  and  the  "order"  were  confounded; 
and  the  indiscriminate  use  of  the  terms  in  De  Vernon's 
work,  written  for  the  Polytechnic  School,  under  the  em 
pire,  and  sanctioned  by  the  emperor  and  a  board  of  his 
officers,  confirms  it.  "  The  oblique  order  is  a  disposition 

*  Jomini  draws  a  very  just  distinction  between  lines  and  orders  of  battle, 
and  he  is,  we  think,  the  first  military  writer  who  has  done  it.  "  I  call  the 
line  of  battle  the  deployed  portion,  or  composed  of  battalions  in  column  of 
attack,  which  an  army  will  take  in  occupying  a  camp  and  ground  upon  which 
to  receive  battle,  without  a  determined  object — it  is  the  proper  name  for 
troops,  formed  according  to  the  rules  for  exercise,  in  one  or  many  lines.  The 
order  of  battle  on  the  contrary,  is  the  disposition  of  troops  indicating  a  deter 
mined  manoeuvre,  as  the  parallel  order,  the  perpendicular,  etc."  L'Art  de  la 
Guerre,  page  214.  They  are  confounded  in  the  Tactics  for  our  army— at 
least  the  names  are. 

f  Montholon. 


M**i 


38  Battle  of  Buena  Vista. 

tending  to  unite  half  the  forces,  at  least,  to  overwhelm  a 
wing,  while  holding  the  other  portion  beyond  reach  of  the 
enemy,  either  in  echellons  or  inclined  from  the  line." 
Taylor's  order  resembled  this  ;  but  neither  he  nor  Wool, 
perhaps,  thought  of  any  particular  disposition,  but  ar 
ranged  the  troops  according  to  the  nature  of  the  ground, 
the  Angostura,  an  essential  point  to  be  defended,  and  the 
plateau,  the  probable  battle-ground,  extending  to  the  left 
and  front.  And  the  centre  and  left  being  in  echellons. 
fortifying  the  remark  that  "  nothing  absolute  should  be 
prescribed,"  varied  from  the  system  of  12  orders  laid  down 
by  Jomini,  one  of  which,  he  supposed,  must  be  inevitably 
employed  in  every  case.  It  was  an  original  modification, 
which  he  had  not  conceived.  Standing  on  the  defensive,* 
with  less  than  half  his  force  (efficient)  on  the  plateau. 
Taylor,  in  our  judgment,  should  have  planted  there  all  his 
horse  artillery,  except  Washington's.  None  was  required 
in  reserve.  A  few  more  pieces,  with  O'Brien,  would 
have  repelled  Pacheco  at  the  outset,  and,  turning  upon 
Lombardini,  well  supported,  would  equally  have  checked 
his  advance.  To  break  our  left — the  weak  point,  seen  at 
a  glance  by  Santa  Anna,  and  promptly  improved — would 
give  a  reverse  fire  upon  our  entire  line,  when,  ordinarily. 
defeat  ensues,  and,  the  communication  cut,  disaster  results. 
When  the  flanks  are  not  strengthened,  a  defensive  oblique 
is  liable,  therefore,  to  the  above  objection.  The  mountain 
slope,  as  Ripley  well  says,  should  have  been  at  once  oc 
cupied,  and  the  front  slope,  which  Marshall  ascended  first 
and  withdrew  from,  under  the  belief  that  he  was  ordered, 
which  would  have  kept  off  Ampudia  from  the  beginning. 
The  cavalry  were  properly  posted,  and,  with  more  guns 
to  have  cut  up  the  enemy's  horse  and  annoyed  Lombar 
dini,  would  have  proved  effective.  As  it  was,  there  was 
no  alternative  but  to  retire.  The  strongest  point  in  our 

*  Jomini  remarks,  on  defensive  combats,  "  that  a  general  who  awaits  the 
enemy  like  an  automaton,  without  aiming  to  do  more  than  fight  valiantly, 
will  be  subdued  when  he  may  be  attacked.  It  is  not  so  with  him  who  awaite 
with  the  firm  resolution  to  combine  decided  manoeuvres  against  his  adversa 
ries,  in  order  to  seize  the  moral  advantage  of  the  offensive  impulse^  and  with 
the  certainty  of  directing  his  masges  on  the  most  important  point ;  in  the 
simple  defensive  this  never  occurs." — page  219.  Taylor  falsified  the  first 
clause.  He  combined  no  manoeuvres — was  on  the  simple  defensive — only 
repelled  whed  attacked — and  yet  triumphed.  We  will  not  pause  to  explain 
the  causes  of  it. 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  39 

line  was  the  Angostura,*  and  yet  the  bulk  of  our  force 
was  concentrated  around  it.  Sanguine  as  Washington 
was  of  repelling  all  efforts  there,  his  confidence  was  not 
shared  by  his  seniors — the  light  artillery,  although  re 
nowned,  was  not  supposed  as  effective  as  it  proved  to  be. 
Bissell  advanced  to  O'Brien's  relief,  and  McKee  and  Bragg 
quickly  crossed  the  road  to  assist ;  but  their  efforts  were 
separate — had  they  been  together,  a  simultaneous  ad 
vance  might,  at  that  time,  have  forced  back  the  enemy. 
And  this  could  have  been  arranged.  The  moment  the 
enemy  formed  his  columns,  it  was  perceived  that  our  right, 
over  the  gullies,  was  not  threatened,  and  McKee  and  Bragg 
moved  away,  under  the  mere  advice  of  Mansfield,  and 
without  orders.  This  was  the  first  crisis  of  the  battle, 
and,  as  is  seen,  it  could  have  been  made  the  last., 

Santa  Anna's  attack  upon  our  whole  line  at  the  same 
time,  was  contrary  to  all  the  rules  of  the  art,  and  can 
never  be  justified,  except  with  a  vast  superiority  of  forces. 
The  experience  of  Mexican  armies  against  Americans, 
might  have  told  him,  that  his  real  superiority  was  not  so 
immense,  and  should  have  taught  him  caution.  A  few 
guns  and  a  small  force  to  engage  Washington  were  suf 
ficient  ;  and  a  similar  or  less  one  should,  by  all  means, 
have  menaced  us  over  the  gullies.  To  carry  our  entire 
line  simultaneously,  was  a  preposterous  conception.  He 
advanced  in  the  parallel  order,  with  his  right  re-inforced. 
After  forcing  O'Brien  and  then  Bissell  to  give  ground, 
Carleton  well  says,  that  had  his  reserves  been  promptly 
brought  forward,  he  would  have  taken  the  plateau. 
Sweeping  down  it  to  the  road — our  centre  crushed — the 
Angostura  inevitably  captured — and  our  army  scattered, 

*  Jomini,  page  221,  deduces  the  following  truths,  from  a  discussion  in  one 
of  his  chapters :  "  1st.  The  topographical  key  of  a  field  of  battle  is  not  al 
ways  the  tactical  key.  2d.  The  decisive  point  of  a  battle-field  is  unquestion 
ably  that  which  unites  the  strategic  advantage  with  the  most  favourable  lo 
calities.  3d.  When  there  are  no  formidable  obstacles  of  ground  about  the 
strategic  point,  this  is  ordinarily  the  most  important.  4th.  Sometimes  the 
determination  of  this  point  depends  on  the  positions  of  the  troops  respective 
ly — in  lines  extended  or  cut  up,  the  centre  is  the  most  essential  to  be  attack 
ed — in  close  lines,  the  centre  is  the  strongest,"  etc.  Angostura  is  called  the  key 
of  Buena  Vista.  For  us  it  was.  It  was  the  strongest  point  by  nature,  and  was 
strengthened  by  art  For  the  enemy,  it  was  neither  the  tactical  nor  topo 
graphical  point  to  be  attacked — this  was  our  left,  as  Santa  Anna  had  the 
military  parts  to  perceive.  And  as  the  strategic  aim  was  probably  to  seize 
our  communications,  and  operate  on  the  Rio  Grande,  it  is  a  question  if  the 
point  selected  for  attack  did  not  combine  all  the  three  requisites. 


40  Battle  of  Buena  Vista. 

to  be  taken  in  detail,  the  day  would  have  been  his  beyond 
recovery.  His  timidity — want  of  perception — or  engross 
ed  attention  upon  a  preconceived*  manoeuvre,  prevented, 
and  it  is  rarely  that  a  general  has  two  certain  opportuni 
ties  of  success  in  the  same  combat.  He,  however,  judi 
ciously  seized  the  mountain  slope,  and  with  equal  judg 
ment  saw  and  struck  at  our  weak  points,  forcing  our  left, 
and  taking  us  in  reverse.  But  even  when  this  was  done, 
the  character  of  the  ground  precluded  the  use  of  artillery, 
and  folio  wing  up  his  success,  upon  the  rear  of  the  plateau — 
the  north  ravine  prevented  the  last. 

The  second  crisis  was  at  the  arrival  of  Taylor,  when 
our  army,  in  the  main,  was  forced,  and  when  the  brilliant 
achievement  of  Davis  against  Ampudia,  rescued  it  from 
overthrow.  Both  of  Davis'  feats  were  most  remarkable, 
and  of  all  others,  perhaps,  on  that  field,  prove  the  extra 
ordinary  daring  of  our  soldiers.  The  first,  repelling  thou 
sands  of  infantry  and  cavalry  with  368  riflemen  !  And 
again,  assisted  by  Lane,  driving  back  1500  cavalry,  on 
open  plain  and  formed  only  in  line  !  His  own  courage 
and  the  quality  of  his  troops  disclose  the  secret.  He  had 
many  gentlemen  in  his  ranks — there  could  be  no  shrink 
ing  when  he  led,  and  they  were  tolerably  disciplined,  and 
had  burnt  powder  before. 

It  was  contrary  to  rule  for  Marshall  and  Tell  to  await 
the  charge  of  cavalry.  A  maxim  says,  "-that  cavalry, 
however  heavy  or  firm  it  may  be,  must  never  wait  to  receive 
the  charge  of  another  body  of  calvary,  not  even  of  light 
cavalry;  for  the  simplest  laws  of  dynamics  show,  that 
it  must  inevitably  be  overthrown  by  the  velocity  of  the 
charging  body."f  Our  men  fired  their  carbines  at  60 
paces,  and  the  enemy  was  upon  them  by  the  time  they 
could  draw  their  swords.  They  were  not  overthrown, 
because,  perhaps,  our  large  horses  could  sustain  the 

*  Minon  says  Santa  Anna  made  no  combinations — that  he  believes  "  a  bat 
tle  is  no  more  than  the  shock  of  men,  with  much  noise,  shouts,  and  shots,  to 
see  who  can  do  the  most,  each  in  his  own  way" — and  "  cannot  conceive  how  it 
happens  that  a  victory  may  be  gained  by  wise  and  well  calculated  manoj- 
vres-" — Carleton — Appendix.  We  disagree  to  this.  Santa  Anna  did  com 
bine  ;  and  his  strategem  of  the  white  flag,  at  the  proper  moment,  to  save 
one-third  of  his  army,  was  very  creditable. 

f  This  is  sanctioned  by  Napoleon,  if  neither  in  Montholon  nor  Las  Casas. 
It  is  said,  in  the  same  authority,  De  Vernon,  that  when  cavalry  mean  to 
charge,  and  are  at  600  yards,  the  first  200  should  be  in  the  small  trot ;  the 
second  200,  full  trot ;  the  next  160  at  a  full  gallop;  and  the  last  50  paces  at 
full  speed. 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  41 

shock  ;  and  their  riders,  stout-hearted,  would  fight  under 
the  disadvantage.* 

The  last  crisis  was  on  the  plateau,  when  O'Brien  lost 
his  two  pieces,  and  Bragg  and  Thomas,  with  four  guns, 
stopped  the  career  of  the  reserves.  And  this  was  the 
grandest  of  all,  because  the  instant  fate  of  our  army 
depended  on  the  successful  issue,  and  for  the  brilliancy  of 
the  achievement.  Nothing  in  the  annals  of  civilized 
warfare  equals  this  feat — nothing  occurs  to  us  as  at  all 
comparable  to  it.  The  rapidity  of  the  fire — the  short 
distance — the  grape  and  canister — the  precision  of  aimf — 
and  the  contrary  in  the  enemy — and  the  inflexible  reso 
lution  to  die  by  the  guns,  combined  to  effect  it.  This  has 
been  called  a  battle  of  horse  artillery  on  our  part ;  and 
while  we  do  not  and  cannot  say  that  others  were  not  es 
sentially  instrumental  in  winning  the  victory,  after  a  ten 
hours'  struggle  of  all  arms,  yet  certainly  without  the 
artillery,  the  day  would  have  been  lost.  It  was  most 
efficient  wherever  it  was  employed.  O'Brien,  early  in 
the  morning,  by  beautiful  firing,  drove  Ampudia  higher 
up  the  mountain  slope,  and  beyond  his  power  of  eleva 
tion.  Against  Pacheco  with  more  men,  and  a  strong  in 
fantry  support,  he  would  probably  have  checked  the  col 
umn,  and  as  it  was,  he  made  great  havoc  in  its  ranks. 
Again  on  the  plateau,  he  retarded  Perez,  and  thus  enabled 
assistance  to  arrive  in  season  to  repulse  him.  His  hero 
ism  here  merits  the  highest  admiration,  and  his  method  of 
"  turning  over"  guns  to  the  enemy,  should  never  be  for 
gotten.  The  array  of  artillery  across  the  plateau,  after 
the  retreat  of  Bowles's  regiment,  alone  prevented  the 
enemy  from  forcing  our  centre,  with  the  disastrous  conse 
quences  which  must  have  ensued.  The  artillery  practice, 
more  especially  Bragg's,  which  all  commend,  drove  the 
enemy  on  the  left  into  the  cul  de  sac,  and  combined  with 
that  from  the  plateau,  would  have  compelled  a  surrender, 
but  for  the  flag.  Washington  held  his  important  post 
against  vast  odds,  and  rescued  hundreds  of  men  in  the 
gorge,  from  certain  destruction.  And  finally,  this  arm 
closed  the  contest  in  a  halo  of  glory,  which  will  encircle 
it  forever. 

*  At  the  battle  of  Sohr,  the  Austrians  awaited  the  Prussian  charge,  and 
the  -whole  body  was  destroyed. 

f  At  Zorndorf,  one  cannon  shot  mowed  down  42  men  !  "Well  served  artil 
lery  is  a  most  effective  arm,  and  we  repeat  that  the  South  should  encourage 
the  organization  of  many  divisions  of  the  horse  artillery. 


42  Battle  of  Buena  Vista. 

With  some  merit,  Buena  Vista  has  also  been  styled,  the 
battle  of  volunteers.  It  is  very  true,  that  over  nine-tenths 
of  the  force  were  of  that  description  of  troops,  but  it  must 
not  be  inferred  that  they  were  militia.  They  were  supe 
rior  to  this  last,  because,  if  the  men  were  not  picked,  the 
ranks  were,  at  least,  filled  by  adventurous  and  daring 
spirits,  and  fortunately,  as  a  general  rule,  the  leading  offi 
cers  were  chosen  by  them,  for  their  merit,  and  not  often 
from  personal  or  political  predilection.  Besides,  if  not 
"  baptized  in  fire,"  they  were  partially  disciplined — the 
Illinois  regiments  had  been  under  most  competent  and  un 
tiring  instructors.  All  the  field  officers  of  the  Kentucky 
infantry  were  West  Pointers ;  and  Marshall  of  the  cav 
alry,  and  Davis  of  the  rifles,  were  from  the  same  institu 
tion.  For  a  prompt  effort,  however  hazardous — for  a 
sudden  grasp  at  victory,  even  in  the  jaws  of  death,  they 
were  inferior  to  none.  Like  the  Romans  of  old,  they 
fought  more  from  confidence  in  individual  prowess,  than 
from  dependence  on  the  "  elbow  touch,"  or  the  multitude. 
And  the  only  fear  to  be  apprehended  was,  that  they  pos 
sessed  not  that  unshrinking  fortitude,  which  could  patient 
ly  receive  the  "  winged  instruments  of  death,"  without  re 
tort — peculiar  to  veterans,  and  which  justified  the  heroic 
Gen.  Michel,  in  exclaiming  at  Waterloo,  "the guard  dies, 
but  never  yields  /"  Yet  our  untried  volunteers  exhibited 
even  this  highest  trait  of  the  soldier,  in  some  instances — 
possibly  attributable  to  the  apparently  desperate  condi 
tion  of  affairs,  which  nerved  the  intelligent  of  all  grades — 
perhaps,  to  their  little  instruction — most  probably  to  the 
presence  of  that  indomitable  chieftain — a  participant  of 
the  danger,  with  the  serene  aspect  of  a  protected  ob 
server — under  whose  eye  they  stood,  and  to  win  whose 
approbation,  they  would  have  stormed  even  the  Rock  of 
Gibraltar ! 

Col.  Davis  in  the  Senate,  said,  that  Buena  Vista  was 
tl  fought  without  an  erroneous  order  as  to  position  or 
time."  This  may  be  true,  and  yet  not  all  the  truth.  With 
regard  to  position*  we  have  briefly  spoken.  But  during 
the  combat,  when  sudden  manoeuvres  are  often,  accord 
ing  to  all  experience,  more  effective  than  the  best  pre 
arranged  combinations  ;  General  Taylor  in  several  very 
important  movements,  gave  no  orders  at  all.  McKee 

*  Col.  Davis,  it  occurs  to  us,  means  the  placing  of  troops,  and  the  time  of 
doing  so.  But  we  will  not  alter  the  text.  His  speech  was  delivered  Aug. 
5th,  1850. 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  43 

and  Bragg  left  the  eminence  in  rear  of  the  crossing  of  the 
gullies,  without  orders,  and  arrived  timely  on  the  Plateau. 
Bragg  again,  in  procuring  ammunition,  perceived  Da 
vis'  struggle  with  the  1500  lancers,  and  hastened  to  his 
assistance.  Again,  when  the  enemy  retreated  along  the 
skirt  of  the  mountain,  (under  the  flag,)  tter  supposed  a  re-  /  fY&t' 
newed  attack  would  be  made  on  the  plateau,  and  flew 
there,  just  at  the  moment  O'Brien  abandoned  his  guns, 
and  without  orders ;  and  Davis  himself  moved  against 
Ampudia  without  orders.*  But  we  do  not  concur  with 
Ripley  by  any  means,  in  censuring  Taylor  for  the  omis 
sion,  or  detracting  an  item  from  his  conduct  of  the  battle, 
and  the  high  credit  that  is  due  to  him.  We  would  rather 
praise  those  officers,  for  quick  intelligence  and  responsi 
ble  action,  for  surveying  the  entire  field — perceiving  when 
ther  services  were  required,  and  hastening  promptly  to 
render  them — in  a  word,  for  anticipating  orders  in  a  cri 
sis,  rather  than  supinely  resting  on  their  arms,  until  the 
General,  at  a  distant  point,  should  direct  by  positive  in 
struction,  through  legitimate  channels,  their  every  move 
ment.  And,  we  confidently  believe,  they  only  anticipated 
the  orders  which  would  have  sent  them  on  the  same  ser 
vices  which  they  performed :  and  that  Taylor  failed  to 
give  the  directions,  because  he  saw  that  they  even  fore 
seen,  and  the  proper  action  begun. 

The  Mexican  historians  assert,  that  if  the  chief  Mexi 
can  officers  had  discharged  their  duty  equally  with  the 
subalterns,  the  result  would  have  been  different ;  and  it  is 
possibly  true :  although,  like  them,  we  will  not  exempt 
their  favorite,  Santa  Anna,  from  the  imputation.  We 
suspect  that  he  was  chary  of  his  person.  His  horse  was 
shot,  it  is  true,  and  he  was  borne  along  with  the  retiring 
column,  in  the  first  repulse.  But  where  was  he,  when  the 
reserves  made  their  grand  attack  ?  Was  he  at  their  head  ? 
Was  he  in  their  midst  ?  It  strikes  us  forcibly,  that  the 
Mexicans  never  so  much  required  the  lead  of  Santa  An 
na,  as  in  this  charge.  An  intrepid  chief,  in  whom  all  had 
unlimited  confidence,  could  unquestionably  have  inspired 
the  enthusiasm,  to  induce  12,000  men  to  over-run  four 
guns  !  A  Ney,  a  Lannes,  or  a  McDonald,  as  at  Wagram, 
would  probably  not  even  have  slacked  his  pace.  The 

*  Two  signal  instances  of  anticipation  are  found  in  the  defence  of  Cesar's 
camp  against  the  Neiwteans,  (in  2d  Book  of  Commentaries,)  and  the  march  of 
Dessaix  to  Marengo,  which  secured  the  victory. 


£- — 


44  Battle  of  Buena  Vista. 

The  Roman  generals  were  not  necessarily  exposed,  save 
after  defeat,  and  following  the  custom  of  many  of  them, 
he  remained  in  the  rear,  and  perhaps  beyond  the  range  of 
our  guns.  But  the  Roman  armies  from  incessant  drilling 
during  peace!  and  their  exalted  morale,  from  almost  inva 
riable  success,  rarely  required  the  inspiring  example  of 
their  leaders.  In  modern  armies  the  battle  fields  are 
much  larger,  exacting  activity  in  the  General — the  use  of 
fire  arms,  exposes  him  more  or  less  at  all  points,  and  the 
danger  of  leading  is  not  much  enhanced  ;  while  the  less 
experience — the  less  training — the  often  diminished  mo 
rale  of  troops,  frequently  demand  his  presence,  to  insure  a 
victory.  Of  all  periods,  over  half  his  forces  engaged,  and 
a  final  effort  to  overthrow  his  adversary,  this  was  the  one 
for  Santa  Anna  to  appear  at  their  head,  and  lead  them  on. 
Higher,  more  patriotic  interests  checked  the  impulse  per 
haps,  and  urged  to  the  security  of  self.  What  if  Taylor 
had  remained  at  the  hacienda  Buena  Vista,  with  a  glass, 
could  he  have  directed  his  troops  with  sufficient  prompt 
ness  ?  Had  he  not  occupied  a  conspicuous  point,  amid 
the  carnage,  near  to  the  '*  flashing  of  his  guns,"  would  the 
volunteers  have  exhibited  the  same  valor  ?  Would  even 
his  artillery  have  been  served  with  the  same  constancy 
and  precision  ?  Whatever  their  bravery,  it  is  highly 
doubtful.  The  example  and  participation  in  hazard,  of  a 
beloved  chieftain,  excite  his  soldiers  to  extraordinary 
exertion.  When  Alexander's  troops  were  perishing  of 
drought  in  the  desert,  a  horn  of  water  was  brought  from 
afar  to  the  King,  who,  instead  of  drinking,  poured  it  upon 
the  sands  before  all  eyes,  and^  quenched  the  thirst  of  the 
entire  army  !  Caesar  marched  bareheaded  before  his  army 
in  Gaul,  in  all  weathers,  and  they  advanced  at  his  order, 
in  sunshine  or  in  storm.  And  Hannibal  and  Napoleon 
trudged  on  foot  through  the  snows  of  the  higher  Alps,  and 
dispelled  both  fatigue  and  cold  from  their  followers.  So 
Taylor  in  that  doubtful  crisis — amid  the  horrors  of  war. 
and  exposed  to  every  shot,  neutralized  the  appalling  dan 
ger  to  his  troops,  inspired  it»i<>  them  his  own  fearless  re 
solution,  and  they  won  for  him  his  noblest  field  !* 

Taylor's  conduct  at  Buena  Vista  was  comparatively 
faultless.     The  few  errors  that  a  severe  criticism  may  de- 

*  Our  limits  exclude  many  reflections  that  we  should  liave  been  pleased  to 
offer. 


Battle  of  Buena  Vista.  45 

tect,  are  unimportant.  Eminent  success  attended  him,  as 
in  all  the  efforts  of  his  career :  and  invariable  success, 
through  a  life  of  vicissitudes  and  of  high  responsibilities, 
marks  the  enlightened  judgment,  rather  than  the  favor  of 
inconstant  fortune.  He  displayed  the  energy,  the  forti 
tude,  the  quick  perception  and  prompt  action,  and  the 
valor  of  the  great  captain  ;  and,  likewise,  the  ready  de 
cision  and  iron  firmness,  when  he  exclaimed  **  we  will 
decide  the  battle  here"  It  was  a  rare  instance  of  sublime 
self-reliance,  akin  to  that  "  destiny"  of  exalted  genius, 
which  impels  it  to  superhuman  trial.  With  the  heroic, 
he  displayed  equally  the  tenderer  virtues  of  the  man.  His 
humanity  was  his  crowning  grace ;  and  the  illustrious 
sentiment,  "  I  WILL  NEVER,  ALIVE,  LEAVE  MY  WOUNDED  BE 
HIND  !"  should  be  inscribed  upon  each  chieftains  banner, 
and  enshrined  in  the  heart  of  every  soldier.  H. 


Lithomount 
Pamphlet 

Binder 
Gaylord  Bros. 

Makers 

Stockton,  Calif. 
NT.  JAN  21,  1908 


